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ABSTRACT
Mobile money services are spreading rapidly in many developed and developing countries across
the world. Whereas in developed economies these new services are seen as a way to make
current services more functional and convenient, in the developing world their relevance in the
process providing access to financial services to the poorest segments of the population is
welcomed and encouraged by the international development community. The spread of mobile
money is seen as a catalyst for financial inclusion and the speed at which these services become
available will be partly due to the stakeholders' capacity for implementing them.
Mobile money projects have new been launched across many developing nations, targeting the
opportunity of a common phenomenon: a gap between the high penetration of mobile services
and the low penetration of financial services. The measure of success of those ventures has been
mixed, with hallmark cases rapidly reaching over 10% of the population and other cases being
discontinued or re-launched in the face of failure.
The history of the development of such projects highlights several lessons for current and future
stakeholders. First, an industry context with high demand and low-enough penetration of
financial services, together with a thriving and innovative telecommunications industry seems to
be conductive to success. Second, a favorable regulatory environment in which regulators allow
telecom operators, banks and small and medium-sized companies to experiment with different
models to provide mobile money to the masses is advisable for avoiding roadblocks for growth.
Third, success will partly depend on the service provider's capacity to develop a far-reaching
ecosystem of merchants, agents, banks and other partners in order to achieve ubiquity. Lastly,
services with strong network effects such as domestic remittances can deliver faster growth than
others, seeding the scale needed to offer more complex financial services over mobile money
platforms.
Thesis Supervisor: Jason Davis
Title: Associate Professor of Technological Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Strategic
Management - MIT Sloan School of Management
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1. Introduction
Amarilis Lopez is a 25-year-old housekeeper in a wealthy eastern Caracas neighborhood in
Venezuela. She works and lives five days a week in a large house for a decent wage which she
mostly uses to support her 6-year-old daughter Frangelis. Frangelis lives with her grandmother in
Guacara a small rural town 2 hours away from Caracas, when her mother works.
The only time Amarilis sees her daughter is on Sundays. Her typical Saturday involves
spending a large amount of money travelling to one of the few malls in which banks are opened
on weekends to cash-in the check she receives every week. After the long lines take up her
morning and early afternoon she finds her way to a distant bus station, to catch the next ride to
Guacara and normally gets there after Frangelis has gone to bed. She would carry cash for the
rest of the day, hoping not to become a victim of one of the highest crime-rates of any city in the
world. She would hope to spend most of Sunday with her daughter, however she needs to settle
debts and pay bills to local shops, informal lenders and utility companies that provide Frangelis
and her grandmother with all the little girl needs to stay in school.
Needless to say, being a single Mother, Amarilis does not have savings and if she did, she
would have to keep her money under the mattress of her small house in crime-struck Guacara,
because she is not eligible for a savings account. Furthermore, the time she spends travelling
back and forth from and to Caracas prevents her from obtaining any type of education during her
free weekends, so she is bound to stay at her current job for a long time.
Because of technology currently available elsewhere, Amarilis's life could be dramatically
different. For instance, instead of getting paid in a Check which she nervously protects every
Saturday in dangerous public buses, she could receive her salary directly in an electronic account
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tied to a cheap mobile phone which she has owned for several years. Instead of going to the bank
to cash-in her check she could go to Guacara town straight out of her work hours on Fridays,
visit a small bodega and cash-out there keeping the money she used to spend visiting the mall as
savings in the same electronic money account. Such an account may even be paid interest
encouraging her to save more. The time she spends in the town can now be concentrated in her
daughter since she could handle the payment of her bills during the free time she has at work
every night, because she could pay those bills from her mobile phone. And when that same
phone rings with an emergency that requires unexpected spending to help her Mother, she does
not have to take a day away from her paycheck to travel to Guacara. She can resolve it quickly
using here phone to transfer money to her mother.
The dream can be taken several steps forward. Because of the time and money Amarilis
could save, there is even a chance she can attend some kind of technical college on week nights.
With her mobile phone account she could even obtain access to and routinely pay off a small
loan to cover tuition. And think about Frangelis, who now sees her mother a lot more. What will
that mean for her future? What impact would an educated mother would have on her life?
And, in a broader context, the spread of access to financial services to people like Amarilis in
hundreds of lesser developed nations can have a rippling effect. The money that hundreds of
domestic migrants like Amarilis spend in rural Venezuela instead of being left in the capital can
be meaningful for the local economies of towns like Guacara anywhere. Furthermore, as many
like Amarilis start to save money in electronic accounts gaining interests, a country like
Venezuela, in dire need of productive investments, can see its capital markets grow ushering in
more productive uses of money.
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Histories like the one of Amarilis can be found anywhere from Peru to Cambodia, and from
the Pakistan to Nigeria. Financial inclusion enhances and empowers the poor in unprecedented
ways and gives them the tools they need to overcome poverty. And the mobile phone, ubiquitous
in most of these countries, can become a channel through which those services are provided.
The most interesting part about these prospects is that the technology that has been
mentioned was not developed in Silicon Valley, a Tokyo Lab or a Soul-based R&D facility. A
Kenyan and a Filipino mobile network operators (NINO's) were pioneers in the later part of the
last decade introducing services which transform simple feature mobile phones into financial
services tools.
Today hundreds of companies have seen and acted upon the same opportunities to launch
mobile money services all across the developing world. Their success rates have been mixed:
some have paralleled the impressive adoption rates seen in Kenya, other have quickly divested
because of failure to stick. This thesis takes a look at some of these stories in the hope of
identifying the key strategic elements that should be addressed when coming up with a mobile
money scheme. The objective is to give business stakeholders as well as government regulators
in the developing world guidelines to assess the probability of success and failure of these
projects. Namely the thesis will look (i) to describe the opportunity of mobile financial access
across the developing world and (ii) to understand the business and industry-wide factors that
make some cases more successful than others.
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2. Mobile Money
2.1.Mobile Money Concepts
Beth Jenkins, a researcher at the Harvard Kennedy School, defines mobile money as "money
that can be accessed and used via mobile phone" (Jenkins). In a broader definition GSMA, a
world-wide association of telecommunications operators which has research and support project
called Mobile Money for the Unbanked, defines the term as a " service in which the mobile
phone is used to access financial services" (GSMA).
In this more comprehensive look at mobile money as an instrument for financial services, the
concept acts as an umbrella for a wide range of services that can be accessed through mobile
telephony and which aim at combining existing financial tools with the convenience of a mobile
phone. CSMG, a consultancy, has narrowed down the use of mobile money into four distinct
categories (Young, Bricker and Hall):
1. Mobile wallet: services in which the mobile phone serves as a substitute for cash or cash
equivalents, and in which users use their phones to pay for diverse products or services.
Some relevant uses for this category that are in use today are:
a. Payments with mobile phones in retail outlets and shops
b. Payments with mobile phones of transportation passes
c. Payments with mobile phones of prepaid cell phone top-ups'
2. Personal Finance Integration: services in which users get the chance to use their mobile
phones as a tool to perform finance-related personal transactions and access to financial
information. Some wide-spread applications are:
A cell-phone top-up is a standard for paying mobile services in most developing countries. Usually it involves the
purchase of a small disposable card in which a code is unveiled. By entering the code into the phone, the users
loads the airtime equivalent to the card purchased, which is to be used with his or her mobile phone.
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a. Accessing savings and checking account information through mobile phones
b. Budgeting through mobile phones
c. Repayment of loans and credit cards through mobile phones
d. Payment of bills through mobile phones
e. Applying for loans or credit cards through mobile phones
3. Peer-to-Peer transactions: services in which the mobile phone is used to transfer money
from one person to the other using and electronic platform. Some uses include:
a. Transferring money from one bank account to the other through the mobile phone
b. Performing domestic or international remittances of cash through mobile phones
c. Sharing coupons through mobile phones
4. Retail Improvement: a less developed category refers to services which improve the
retailing experiences of customers through the use of mobile phones. Some early-stage
experiences have been found in:
a. Using loyalty program benefits through mobile phones
b. Acquiring and using coupons through the use of mobile phones
c. Checking in and out of hotels and shops through the use of mobile phones
d. Targeted advertising through the use of mobile phones
Generally speaking, the applications of mobile money technologies can also be understood
through the point of view of what it offers customers. There is a varying degree of value
propositions that services providers can communicate and deliver to customers through the use
of mobile money. Those propositions can be categorized in three relevant clusters:
* Convenience: leveraging the use of mobile telephony and what it entails to offer more
convenient ways to provide services which the customer already enjoyed. An example of
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this is the use of mobile phones to access your bank account and perform electronic
transactions through mobile phones. Although the services of obtaining information on
your previous transactions and performing bank transfers already existed through the use
of bank agencies or on-line applications, the use of mobile phone makes the process more
convenient. Users do not have to go all the way to the agencies or wait to go home and
get on the computer to perform a transaction. They can use the phone to satisfy their
financial need wherever they may be.
* Functionality: the use of mobile technology to expand or enhance the functionality of a
previously existing service or solution. An example of this is the use of mobile phone as
transportation passes. Although the solution already existed (in this case paying with cash
or credit card), mobile technology provides an improved way to go through the process.
Instead of having to collect the amount of cash needed for the bus pass (oftentimes
requiring exact amounts of cash) or pulling out a credit card, some solutions like Near
Field Communication (NFC) allow customers to simply move their phone close to a
receiver in the station or bus, effectively performing the transaction.
* Access: in a more complex way, mobile technology can allow for the reduction of
transaction costs associated with physical infrastructure, permitting customers who
previously did not have access to a particular financial service to experience it for the
first time while protecting service providers' profits. An example of this is the use of
domestic or electronic remittances through the use of a mobile phone. Whereas such
services could sometimes be linked to the use of a bank account, some service providers
will use the low cost and broad access of mobile telephony to allow users to transfer
money from phone to phone without the need for an account. In places where the access
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to electronic transactions in limited, the mobile phone brings the possibility of enjoying
the security, affordability and functionality of this type of transactions to people who
were previously excluded from it.
There is certainly tremendous potential for mobile money to deliver value in each of these
fields improving the lives of the users who engage with these services. In the examples that have
been analyzed, the savings of time and money for people that can now save a visit to financial
institution mean not only more productive lives for users but a lesser need for banks to incur in
the cost of maintaining agencies. Similarly, transportation companies can offer easier ways to
access their services while at the same time improving the flow of people within their stations or
buses. Finally, the idea that the phone can become a cornerstone for access to financial services
is, for many, the most far-reaching effect that mobile money technologies may have. As this
thesis will explain, the potential of mobile money as a means for financial inclusion is
extraordinary as past experiences in developing countries would suggest.
Another relevant concept to understand is what experts call "the mobile money ecosystem".
Rather than being a feature developed and delivered by one company or service provider, mobile
money usually involves a large number of players with interests that are aligned with the
growing reach of some of these services. Building on previous research (Jenkins) a broad
categorization should include:
* MNO's: who provide the basic infrastructure behind how these technologies work as well
as the most direct contact channel with customers.
" Banks: who will undoubtedly be providing some of these services, but that could also act
as enablers and complementors for the implementation of third-party initiatives.
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e Handset manufacturers: who contribute with the construction of the customer experience
by providing the hardware and some of the software upon which some of these services
will run.
* Merchants and Retailers: who will benefit from the traffic of users who will be convinced
to come into their stores because of the use of the new technology
e Regulators: who will seek to provide the guidelines for proper and secure functioning of
these new technologies which have the complex financial services industry behind it.
" Non-governmental Organizations (NGO's) and civil society: with an interest vested in
improving the lives of the poorest segments of society, will see these services with a
potential for positive impact on development. In some cases they could potentially act as
catalysts by massively using the service to provide aid in form of cash.
" Distribution networks: which, in the case of some services, will be pivotal in establishing
a touch-point with users in order to provide the services.
2.2.Mobile Money in the Developing World
Whereas in developed countries mobile money is seen as a way to make financial
transactions more convenient or in a way to add functionality to current services, in developing
countries access becomes the key value proposition and it gives this technology a largely
different meaning. In countries where penetration of financial services is remarkably low and the
reach of mobile telephony expands exponentially, mobile money is seen as a way to give people
access to financial services rather than just facilitate it.
The ten years previous to the world economic crisis of 2008 saw impressive worldwide
growth of two industries that have often been seen as pivotal in the development of any society:
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telecommunications and financial services. However, such growth and the access of those
services has been uneven in developing countries with telecom operators growing more rapidly
and expanding access from the wealthier to the poorest sectors in the communities in which they
operate.
A good measure that can help predict and describe the situation of access to financial
services is the penetration of bank branches within the population in each region. Traditionally
bank branches have served as a tool for a bank to expand the base of its customers and service
them throughout the geographies of the countries in which they operate. The indicator also
signals the profitability of a particular geographic locations from the point of view of a bank, as
usually banks will open new branches in places in which they find enough customers to justify
the investments and operating costs. A look at the following graph describes the disparity
between regions when it comes to bank branch penetration:
Branches, commercial banks (per 100,000 adults)
(World Bank WDI, 2009)
26.90
15.11
12.19 11.27
6.35
3.02
European UniDn Midde East& North Africa Latin America&Caribbean East Asia & Pacific (all South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa (all
(all income levels) (all income levels) income levels) income levels)
As evidence suggests places like Latin America have less than half bank branches per every
100.000 adults than developed regions like Europe, whereas in Sub Saharan Africa the situation
is significantly worst.
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In contrast telecommunication services and, specifically mobile telephony, have been able to
reach a large proportion of the population in the developing world in a way in which it has
outpaced more mature markets. The following graph tells part of that story:
Whereas Europe has been able to triple its penetration levels in ten years, in places like South
Asia where less than 1% of the population had mobile phones in 1999, the figure has multiplied
by a factor of over 220. Growth has certainly been impressive as MNO's have invested
hundreds of millions of dollars to develop infrastructure and capture that value.
This helps explain why today figures of penetration of financial services pale when compared
to those of mobile phones. The following graph tells part of this story in selected developed and
underdeveloped nations:
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)
(Wolrd Bank WDI, 1999-2009) U 1999 12009
123.43
88.98
79.37
65,69
34.15 45.78 37,64 26.30
011 '1 1 1 0.19 0.99 N 0.12
Furopean Union Latin America & Middle East & North East Asia & Pacific (all South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa (all least developed
Caribbean {ail income Africa (all income income levels) income levels) countries: UN
levels) levels) classifiation
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* Mobile phone subscriptions per every 100 inhabitants 2009 (World Bank)
** Composite access to financial services indicator 2007 (Honohan)
As evidence suggests countries like Brazil are surpassing the threshold of 100%
penetration of mobile services to resemble developed nations such as Spain, whereas in terms of
financial services countries like Tanzania do not reach even 10% of households. The composite
measure shown in the graph accounts for formal and informal access to financial services and so
the figures of formal banking penetration can be even more alarming. In Paraguay, for example,
it is noted that fewer than 6% of the population have any sort of bank account (Tellez and
McCarty).
This context has led Mobile Network Operators (MNO's) across the developing world to see
access to financial services as a big opportunity to provide even more comprehensive services to
its customers. In most cases those MNO's have the market knowledge, the technological
infrastructure as well as strong relationships with governments and regulators, which make the
Access to Finandal Services and Mobile Telephony
B Mobile Phone Penetration* a Composit Access to Financial Sevices*
130
89 90 91 91
60 63
45 48 43
37 4020
10 12
Uganda Hait Tanzania- India Kenya Pakistan Phdippnes Paraguay Brazil Korea, Rep Spain united United
Staten Kingdcom
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investment in mobile money feasible. In their eyes the opportunity of tapping into the un-met
demand for financial services through the mobile phone means:
e A way to produce incremental revenue through the up-selling of services which by
themselves can be charged to customers
e A way to increase customer loyalty with the assumption that a customer who uses
more than one product from a company will probably stay longer
e A way to reduce distribution costs of airtime since, in most cases, the mobile money
services can also act as an automatic way to top-up prepaid mobile accounts.
2.3.History and current State of Mobile Money
In the developed world mobile money schemes have been around for over a decade. Since
the advent of the internet and the increase of mobile phone penetration, both banks as well as
telecom operators have looked for ways to provide convenient features to allow customers to
perform transactions through mobile phones.
However, in the developing world the first initiatives towards providing mobile money
services to an expanding base of mobile subscribers came in the beginning of the 2000's. The
oldest-know high-profile case is that of Philippine's Telecom market leader Smart
Communications which launched its first mobile money experiment back in 2001 (Pickens).
SmartMoney sought to take part in the multi-billion dollar international remittances corridor that
flows into the Philippines. Over 11 % of Philippine's GDP comes from a massive Filipino
diaspora sending money from abroad (World Bank). Similarly, domestic remittances are also
large. Smart developed a technology in which customers can receive and send money from their
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phone from both domestic and international outlets. Furthermore, through the years SmartMoney
has evolved expanding its ecosystem of agents, banks and partners.
The example of SmartMoney has been followed around the world. In 2010 telecom
conglomerate GSMA reported that over 100 mobile money projects were to come live before the
end of the year (GSMA). Today, the same organization tracks over 129 projects in Asia, Africa
and Latin America, and expects to have more than 90 come alive in 2012 (GSMA). The promise
of mobile money for the unbanked is becoming a reality.
However, the battle for financial inclusion as an outcome to the spread of mobile money
is far from being won. A number of challenges are faced by all of the players in the mobile
money ecosystems. The first is to come up with the kind of scale to make this new industry a
Mobile Money Trmdisd by OSMA
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2 2
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sustainable one and to have the level of impact that the world aspires from it. Only pioneers like
Kenya's M Pesa and SmartMoney have reached levels of over 8% of the total population for a
service that is aimed at the massive amount of unbanked in some of these countries. Rapid
uptake remains the key challenge for the early life of the mobile money industry in the
developing world.
Another important challenge is usage. Even taking into account the wide spread of
customers that M Pesa has been able to reach, an MIT study suggests that M Pesa users only
perform remittances once every 3 to 4 months (Suri and Jack). And remittances continue to be
the most widely adopted mobile money service. This points to another challenge: the capacity for
companies already established as mobile money players to persuade their customers into using
more elaborate financial services.
In order to see the kind of transformative effect that development economists are
expecting from mobile money, this new industry has to evolve to provide more comprehensive
financial services that can actually empower people and increase productivity from the poor.
That transformation is already been seen in some cases. Kenya's M Pesa, probably the best
known mobile money project, recently partnered with a major Kenyan bank to launch M Kesho a
scheme to associate mobile money accounts to savings accounts which could eventually be used
to provide micro-credit and insurance services (Camner, Pulver and Sjablom). Yet, it is still to be
seen whether MPesa or other companies are actually able to apply the kind of strategies that will
allow them to increase adoption and up-sale into more impactful financial services.
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3. Methodology
This thesis looks at the intersection between the experience from various mobile money
projects around the developing world and the different analytic approaches that are generically
used to evaluate the strategic environment, performance and sustainability of any particular
business project. This section outlines the type of analysis being done for a set of nine projects
that will be discussed and how such work helps to come up with conclusions about plausible
strategies for future projects.
3.].Project Selection and Analysis
The projects analyzed were selected taking three specific criteria into account: geographic
location, adoption level and data availability.
Geographic Location:
It is widely acknowledged in business literature that the prospects for success of any
economic endeavor depend in part of the context and setting in which such a project takes place.
As it is discussed in the following sections, the socio-economic conditions in which projects are
developed are commonly seen to be determinants of much of the decisions and outcomes that are
seen in mobile money projects. Understanding that different geographic locations have the
tendency to produce diverse socio economic conditions, this thesis has concentrated in
evaluating three projects from three different areas of the world: Latin America, Africa and Asia.
It is worth noting that all of the projects were selected from under-developed countries or
countries with low-income status according to the United Nations (World Bank). This is mainly
because the thesis aims at understanding mobile money in the context of lesser-developed
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nations in which, as argued previously, it is thought to have the most profound developmental
impact.
Adoption Level:
Another relevant criterion useful for evaluating any business projects is whether or not it
has been successful. As Phil Rosenzweig would argue "in business, performance is inherently
relative, not absolute" which suggests that a company's success can only be measured against the
performance of other companies (Rosenzweig). To avoid survivor bias or what Rosenzweig
would call "The Halo effect" this thesis combines the analysis of successful mobile money
projects with that of failed ones.
Arguably there are numerous ways to account for success or failure in the mobile money
industry. The amount of transactions can be a measurement that could highlight the total amount
of activity that is being handled through these platforms. However such a measure offers the
danger of accounting for a small amount of users who are doing a large share of transactions.
Similarly, the total currency value of those transactions has the same limitation. Since a lot of the
mobile money study revolves around its capacity to reduce financial exclusion, accounting for
the amount of people that use the service seems like a plausible way to account for the success of
any mobile money scheme. In order to be able to compare different projects in different countries
the relative measure of penetration (percentage of users in the total population) is accounted for.
Data Availability:
This thesis will be based on previous research by journals, academic material, focused
research institutions as well as public records of stakeholders in the mobile money community.
Understanding this work as secondary research, relevant limitations appear when it comes to
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acquiring data for analysis. This explains why the third criterion for selecting countries and
projects is how much data is available for every particular scheme. Data does not only refer to
quantitative information such as number of users or dimension of agent network, but also
qualitative information on the performance, challenges and limitations of each case.
Taking the three criteria into account the projects involved are:
Region
Africa
Asia
Latin America
Country
Kenya
Uganda
Tanzania
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Indonesia
Paraguay
Brazil
Haiti
Project
M Pesa
Airtel Zap
M Pesa
SmartMoney
eZ Pay
T Cash
Giros Tigo
Oi Paggo
T Cash
As it is shown in the following graph, there is high adoption, moderate adoption and low
adoption projects in each region, having the high adoption threshold at 8% and the low adoption
threshold at 1%.
6.69
9.11
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Adoption - Mobile Money Users per every 100 People
(GSMA and other sources *; 2010- 2011)
Kau M Pesa 3771
Paraguay Tigo 9.71
Phiipines - Smart
Tanzania M Pesa
Haiti - T Cash
Indonesia - T Cash
Uganda - Airtel 0.42
Sri Lanka eZ Pay 0.32
Brazil - Oi Pago 0.13
3.50
* Paraguay Data from 2011 La Nacion; Brazil Data from 2010 Cielo; Haiti Data from 2011 Movillion; Indonesia Data from 2011
TeleGeography
3.2.Analytic Framework
The analysis of each project has been done taking into account both context conditions,
external to the development of the project, as well as performance elements associated with the
strategic decisions and implementation tactics of each company. In terms of external conditions,
the thesis has looked at the socio-economic context of the country in which each project has
taken place as well as industry-specific information from the businesses involved. In the case of
project specific analysis the focus has been placed on understanding the ecosystem that has been
U -
.
1.96
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created for the deployment of each service as well as a general understanding of the product
development outcomes of each case.
Socio Economic Conditions
All of the projects analyzed are currently in deployment in developing countries.
However, the diverse nature of the developing world makes it necessary to analyze each project
through the understanding of the different socio economic variables that characterize each
particular country. It is commonly held that economic conditions constrain the decisions of
economic players such as the companies that will be analyzed.
In general, the developing world has shown impressive economic performances in the
last five years when compared to both developed countries as with their own performance in the
later part of the 20th century. However particularities from each economy account for severe
differences existing today in the level of development and prospects for growth from each
country.
When looking at socio economic conditions, the analysis will center mostly in economic
growth and the forces behind it. Similarly, a brief assessment of how such growth has or has not
translated into poverty alleviation will also be made. Other indicators such as proportion of rural
population will help explain economic conditions relevant to the context of the projects that will
be analyzed. Prospects for further economic growth based on economic prediction from widely
recognized institutions such as The Economist Intelligence Unit (The Economist) as well as from
new development theories on economic complexity (Hausmann and Hidalgo), will also be
incorporated into the analysis. The brief study of the socio-economic conditions of each country
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will set the context to understand the development and current state of the industry surrounding
mobile money.
Industry Structure:
Mobile Money has to be understood as being in the intersection between the
telecommunication and the financial services industries. In this part of the analysis, each
project's industrial context will be analyzed to understand the current competitive environment
in which such schemes are being deployed.
Classic Industry Structure analysis models such as Michel Porter's five forces will be
used to understand: current competitive situation of both telecom and banking industries, degree
of complementarity between them and regulatory conditions that could affect the partnerships or
deployments taking place (Porter). Other less important forces such as the power of suppliers
will be overlooked, in the understanding that in all of the cases MNO's running the projects have
enough market power to limit the influence of any particular provider of technology or services.
Market competition will be looked at for both the telecommunications and the financial
services industry taking into account amount of players, market share of larger players as well as
the Herfindahl - Hirschman Index, widely used in the telecom industry (Bank of America Merrill
Lynch). In this part, other basic indicators such as penetration of services will also be
commented, as they will be relevant in understanding the prospects for success or failure of each
project.
Namely, the aim of analyzing industry structure of each case will be to (i) understand the
technological context in which these projects will take places and how conductive they can be
to the type of innovation needed for the launch of a new service and (ii) to identify possible
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drivers for demand based on the previously-descripted premise of lack of access to financial
services.
Project Performance and Ecosystem
The latter part of each analysis will center on the way in which each project has deployed
each particular service or service features. Understanding previous research on platform strategy,
the projects will be looked at from a platform perspective (Eisenmann, Parker and Alstyne).
Mobile Money connects users with other users, with merchants, with agents and with financial
institutions, placing the service provider in the middle of what is commonly called a "two-sided-
market".
In this platform view, the thesis will look for interactions between the company
deploying the services and each side of the markets they are connecting, in order to understand
their successes and failures. According to Cusumano a key lever for platform leadership is
company's ability to "build an ecosystem through cooperation and assistance, rather than
coercion" (Cusumano). Hence this works looks to understand the key indicators behind the
performance of each project as an outcome of an ecosystem-building strategy.
A few theoretical elements to look for will be the ability to generate same side and cross-
side network effects, interconnectivity of each platform and level of differentiation in those cases
in which there is already competition in mobile money (Cusumano).
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4. Project Profiles
4.J.Low Adoption Projects
4.1.1. EZ Pay - Sri Lanka
The Socio Economic Context
Following over 25 years of civil war, the government of Sri Lanka has embarked in an
aggressive pursuit of economic growth which will be mainly driven by infrastructure
investments. The economy grew at 8% during 2010 and The Economist Intelligence Unit
forecast that it will continue to grow at a pace of 7.4% from 2013 to 2016 (The Economist).
Optimistic economic outlooks which stems from the stabilization of the country are encouraging
and they invite foreign direct investment and growth.
At the same time, the current conditions of the Sri Lankan people are still precarious.
Almost 30% of people live under 2$ a day and, although the island has a heavily dense
population, more than two thirds of the population lives in rural areas (World Bank). The quality
of education has deteriorated as government has pulled funding to invest in the war, and the
country's trade (its most important source of revenue) has also suffered during the war. Most of
the country's output is from services and agriculture only accounts for 13% of GDP and 33% of
the labor force (Central Intelligence Agency).
A large contingent of international remittances is also a relevant characteristic of the Sri
Lankan economy. Having a large diaspora of citizens who fled the country during the conflict,
the remittances corridor is constant and sizable. Money coming from abroad inflow of
remittances is almost 3Billion which places it as the second largest inflow of international
currencies to the country after garment exports (The Economist).
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The Technological Context
The Telecommunications industry is recognized as one of the key drivers of economic
growth for Sri Lanka in recent years. It has been the anchor of a booming service sector and
connectivity has improved dramatically (The Economist). Partial privatization started early, in
1997, and now international direct investment fuels the sector. By 2009 mobile services reached
68% of the population a 30-fold increase from the 2001 figure of 2% (World Bank). Internet
usage has also increased greatly and mostly on urban areas, and today most government agencies
and companies actively operate web pages. Internet banking has also emerged, with banks
looking for more efficient ways to service its large bases of customers.
The telecom sector is also extremely competitive. Market leader Dialog, accustomed to
high levels of adoption rates for its services, now faces steep competition from other three
increasingly growing companies including India's giant Airtel. Dialog holds 44% of the market
and the price pressure as well as its decision to heavily invest in 3G infrastructure have given it
decreasing profit margins in the last few years (IFC). This situation could potentially constrain
the capacity for innovation of Dialog and other players.
The Demand for Financial Services
Since liberalization in 2003 the banking sector of Sri Lanka has grown rapidly. Sri Lanka
has become a benchmark for a government-led financial sector that has achieved both growth
and inclusiveness in less than 10 years. By 2009, Sri Lanka had 1,650 accounts per 1,000 adults
impressive when compared to the median in South Asia which is 318 (IFC). Its composite access
to financial services indicator is an impressive 59% the highest amongst the countries analyzed
Page 24
by the thesis (Honohan). The main reason for the high level of access is the structure of the
industry. The top three commercial banks are state owned, and the first two of those control over
41% of the assets (IFC). All state-owned banks have a mandate to extend retail infrastructure to
the rural areas of the country which accounts for the high level of branch penetration (9
commercial bank branches and over 50 cooperatives per every 100,000 adults) (World Bank).
Other sources of demand could come from services such as ATM's, credit and debit cards, from
which penetration continues to be low.
This accounts for a situation in which there is less banking services demand than in other
developing countries. However data also shows that per user balances are the negative outcome
of having such a broad range of customers. Whereas account ratios, which are indicative of
income per-user income, in Pakistan and Bangladesh are over 2.0, in the case of Sri Lanka the
small balance in accounts result in a ratio of 0.4 (IFC). This could be indicative of the Banks'
unwillingness to reach broader audiences than those they currently serve. Furthermore, new
private-sector banks are likely to continue to pursuit higher-income customers.
The eZ Pay Ecosystem
In 2009 Dialog partnered with state-owned NDB Bank in order to launch its first mobile
money project: eZ Pay. It would be the first distinct operator-led mobile money effort in the
country and it provided the struggling Dialog with an opportunity to reduce distribution costs for
its pre-paid top-ups as well as to obtain new revenue streams (IFC).
The business model planned for sustained growth and specified that transaction fees
would be shared not only by the bank and Dialog, but also with the software provider. Utility
bills seemed to be the first focus of the model and merchants were recruited to do cash-in and
Page 25
cash-out transactions, whereas registration was only done in Dialog service centers. Eventually
Dialog envisioned bringing in other banks and even other operators to integrate into the platform
(IFC).
The Outcome
From its launch in 2009 the product was only able to acquire 6,600 users (GSMA).
Reportedly the efforts to continue to promote eZ Pay were halted in February 2009. The outcome
falls short of Dialog's vision of acquiring 100,000 customers in order to break-even with the
product (IFC). Continued expansions of merchants, bill payment options or product portfolio
were also halted.
The main reason behind the failure of eZ Pay has to do with the lack of a consistent
customer-facing value proposition that could appeal to a specific audience. In a country
characterized with high penetration of financial services it did not target the small segment of
underserved unbanked users. However it also did not target the higher-income banked customers
of NDB. It seemed to try to acquire a massive audience without the consistency needed to appeal
to a banking-literate population.
In consequence Marketing efforts, so relevant to distinguish the product from existing
alternatives, were inadequate and limited. Months after the launch most marketing support ended
and not enough material was distributed to merchants in order to promote the service (IFC). IFC
reckons that Dialog failed at targeting a specific market need in a very particular country. In their
view both retail payments, because of the lack of debit and credit cards in the market, as well as
peer-to-peer transactions, because of national and international remittances corridors, were the
most attractive opportunities that Dialog did not pursue (IFC).
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4.1.2. Oi Paggo - Brazil
The Socio Economic Context
Brazil is, arguably, one of the most important and fast-growing emerging economies in
the world. According to the World Bank it has grown at an average pace of over 3.6% over the
last 10 to become world's seventh largest economy (World Bank). Furthermore its growth has
been accompanied by a significant reduction of the historical levels of inequality and poverty
that the country has had. Brazil's has taken its poverty head count ratio from 35.4% of the
population in 1999 to only 21.4% in 2009. This means that in a rough estimate Brazil brings
around 7 Million people from poverty to middle income every year.
This context provides a promising economic environment to new business in general as
well as for mobile money ventures. One of the most important growth areas in the last 10 years
in Brazil has actually been financial services. This has meant both that large domestic financial
institutions have grown significantly and that new players have also entered the sector.
The Technological Context
Mobile Network operators have aggressively invested in increasing infrastructure and
capturing the value opportunities presented by increased purchasing power. In Brazil only four
MNO's (Vivo, Claro, TIM and Oi) control 95% of the market (Bank of America Merrill Lynch).
They all have over 18% of market share and have enjoyed high levels of growth for the past five
years. Even though in 2010 mobile penetration in Brazil surpassed the 100% barrier, analysts
predict more growth in the sector as broadband (both mobile and fixed) and smartphones
continue to become ubiquitous (Bank of America Merrill Lynch). This, together with the first-
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mover advantage undertaken by banks, explains the lack of interest of MNO's is being
innovative pioneers in the mobile money market.
Brazil is also one the most technologically advanced banking sectors in the developing
world, having more POS per capita than any other Latin American country (World Bank).
Furthermore the Brazil holds a level of internet penetration (40% in 2010) higher than that of the
Latin American region (at 33% in 2010), growing at an average 33% yearly over the last ten
years (World Bank). This has also stimulated banks to innovate in On-line banking which is
another way to efficiently service its increasing base of customers.
The Demand for Financial Services
The growth of the financial services industry fueled by the rise of major banks with
global ambitions such as Itau and Brandesco, has helped ignite economic growth in Brazil in the
last 15 years. Particularly, the growth of microcredit through incumbent banks and new focused
banks has been impressive. The World Bank and other analyst deem Brazil as a leader and
benchmark in offering Branchless Banking services (CGAP). Many banks have innovated in
establishing services to reach the lower income levels of the society and have used a network of
branchless channels to do so. Today these new channels reach over 99% of Brazil's
municipalities. (CGAP) This has dramatically improved access to financial services in a country
historically marked by high levels of poverty. The composite access to financial services
measure has Brazil with 43% of penetration, significantly better than other large Latin American
nations such as Mexico (25%), Argentina (28%) or Venezuela (28%)2 (Honohan).
2 Chile is the leader in Latin America with 60% (Honohan)
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It is also worth noting that a lot of this change is commonly attributed to strong efforts
from the government to promote adoption of financial services. GCAP states that "Brazil's
success with correspondents is a result of 10 years of back-to-back regulatory steps, evolving
from more restricted possibilities to less stringent licensing conditions (CGAP)." Regulation has
allowed and encouraged Banks which today are aggressively taking steps to reduce the gap in
demand for financial services and innovating in business models that allow them to reach the
poor.
Strong competition is now in place with top tier Brazilian banks such as Brandesco or
Banco do Brazil, higher-end international banks such as Santander, and newcomers focusing on
micro-credit such as Banco Lemon. Most of those institutions have looked to serve the massive
market of unbanked. Such growth explains why most of the interest on mobile banking
technologies has come from banks instead of from the telecommunication industry. Fighting
intensely for market share, banks saw the growth of income in the lower sectors of the economy
as an opportunity. Banco Limon was a pioneer in establishing networks of correspondents to
serve the poor. Yet it was quickly overtaken by the major banks which moved in with similar
business models (CGAP).
Oi Paggo Ecosystem
Oi is Brazil's third largest MNO with approximately 18% of the mobile market (Bank of
America Merrill Lynch). In 2005 it launched its Paggo product to allow customers to use their
feature phones to perform retail payments. As it was launched it exemplified a Telecom's move
into an adjacent field building its own platform and network of customers and retailers to capture
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value. It targeted directly the poor and unbanked aiming to offer them something similar to a
credit card that they could use to substitute cash (Telco2).
Its product development strategy started with and revolved around retail payments. This
required Oi to leverage its existing base of top-up agents and establish new agreements to make
sure that enough merchants would accept the payments. Its strategy was always to provide low
fees to merchants and looked to keep them under 2.5% (Telco2). Furthermore, being partly
owned by Banco do Brazil, Paggo has relied upon the POS Cielo network. Additionally strong
advertising support was given to the product including massive TV campaigns highlighting ease
of use.
The Outcome
After almost seven years in the market Oi Paggo has struggled to make it beyond
IMillion customers and actual regular users don't surpass 250.000 (Telco2). Although Oi pulled
from its experience in marketing technological new products, its agent relationships, and its
partnerships, it failed to make the kind of progress that was initially expected. A commonly cited
explanation is that regulation did not allow Oi to go beyond the management of an e-wallet to
advance its product development strategy into more sticky services such as peer to peer or bill
payments.
However, the most important explanation can be found in industry conditions. Unlike in
other countries where MNO's have had exclusive first mover advantages, Oi had climb into a
market where people have other options for accessing financial services. Although banks have
had limited experiences in providing mobile solutions to its clients, poor people in Brazil already
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had access to agents that could serve as providers of cash, micro-loans or remittances, which
made the need for an e-wallet less pressing.
Additionally the same industry structure points to an unfavorable agent dynamic for Oi.
Whereas, a lot like most other countries, MNO's have longstanding relationships with small
business to sell pre-paid top ups, in Brazil Banks have done a remarkable job of recruiting agents
themselves. Therefore the agent infrastructure in brazil is highly developed and has been
introduced for years to the type of cash in and cash out transactions relevant to make mobile
money ventures work. Yet the influence of the massive micro-banking industry offering
commissions on account openings or small loan processing, has made the value proposition of Oi
towards agents less attractive. This also explains how in terms the reach of its agent network Oi
is behind the most prominent examples of branchless banking in Brazil. And, as it is discussed in
chapter 5, a ubiquitous agent network is vital in the development of the cross-side network
effects that are needed to increase adoption rates.
4.1.3. Airtel - Uganda
The Socio Economic Context
After years of conflict and instability, the 1990's saw Uganda, a country with vast natural
resources, take on major political and economic reforms to promote growth. Today Uganda has
achieved sustained economic growth averaging over 7% in the last ten years (World Bank). The
economy depends on agriculture for over 80% of labor and 21% of GDP. Furthermore, it has
been able to increasingly diversify its economy from the dominance of coffee exports, now
exporting fish products and tea. The country is also working on developing an oil industry
because of recently found oil deposits (Central Intelligence Agency). Recent studies on
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economic complexity forecast that Uganda will be the country with the most GDP growth in the
world at over 6.4% from 2009 to 2020 (Hausmann and Hidalgo).
However, Uganda continues to be a poor country with a per capita GDP of slightly over $
1.200 and over 64% of population living under 1$ a day. Its reliance on agriculture explains why
still over 86% of people live in rural areas (World Bank).
The Technological Context
Telecommunications in Uganda has been booming with growth rates surpassing 50% as
liberalization of mobile telephony has increased competition sharply (Bank of America Merrill
Lynch). Today there are five major mobile network operators and intense competition has
produced a price war that has significantly reduced average revenue per user. However,
penetration continues to be at a low 39% and companies are investing hundreds of millions of
dollars in revamping infrastructure in order to seize more growth in subscriptions (World Bank).
Furthermore, opportunities abound for mobile internet, as less than 20% of people have access to
web connectivity (Bank of America Merrill Lynch).
The Demand for Financial Services
The reforms undertaken in the 1990's included restructuring of the financial sector. Local
informal banks abounded and the government undertook intervention to formalize the sector and
clean up risky and illegal ventures (Bankers Academy). After years of reform, in 2004, the
Central Bank decided to place a moratorium in the licensing of new banks, which significantly
reduced the chances for growth in the industry.
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Since the lifting of the moratorium in 2007 increased competition has taken place seeing
new entrants in the market to challenge established firms with a strong presence such as Stanbic
Bank, which commands the market with over 22% of the assets (Bankers Academy). However,
history has made the banking sector un Uganda lag behind its East Africa peers, and this has had
an obvious impact in increased demand for financial services. Uganda has only 1.9 formal bank
branches per 100.000 inhabitants whereas Kenya has 4. Estimated penetration of banking
accounts is only 16% and composite access to financial services stands at only 20% (Honohan).
The Airtel Ecosystem
Formerly named Zein, Airtel lags behind MTN in the mobile phone market in Uganda
with around 18% (Bank of America Merrill Lynch). Those same two companies have been in
competition for increasing its customer base aggressively since the late 1990's. In 2009 the
company decided to launch its ZAP mobile money product knowing that MTN would launch its
own.
From its conception ZAP looked for differentiation by providing a suite of services rather
than just money transfer. Apart from domestic remittances it emphasizes bill and merchant
payment services as well as phone top-up. This approach resulted in a few particularities worth
analyzing (Leishman):
- Zap preached a strategy of cash substitution, meaning that it encouraged its customers to keep
money in their accounts rather than only using it for transfer. The company seeks to create a
cash-free ecosystem in which a customer would receive his salary through the system and then
use it to pay bills, buy in restaurants and retail shops, top-up their phones and transfer money to
his/her family.
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- Based on the cash-substitution premise it has looked for agents who do not only do cash-in and
cash-out, but who would also accept payments for their businesses through the product, and it
incentivized its agents to keep float in their accounts.
- Aiming at establishing a ubiquitous ecosystem Airtel has worked to get B2B partnership in
which it ensures the use of its products to pay salaries to employees or settle invoices with
suppliers.
The company has established a low transaction fee strategy in order to compete with
MTN and it has leveraged its existent airtime dealer network to recruit more agents. Its agent
strategy appears to be successful having more than 4000 and outpacing MTN.
The Outcome
The last record of Zap customers places penetration of the service under 1% of the total
Uganda population with approximately only 140.000 users (Leishman). Low levels of adoption
can be attributed to lack of customer awareness and market power. Research by GSMA suggests
that the company has sharply underinvested in marketing efforts to educate customers about the
services (Leishman). In a country that can be considered literate in terms of mobile money and
with its top competitor having over 40% of the mobile market, the company needs to find a
strong way of communicating its value proposition to differentiate itself from the competition.
Furthermore, Airtel's strong focus in cash substitution across its platform is quite
ambitious and will take a long time to stick. It will have to convince not just users but other
relevant players in its ecosystem (merchants, agents, medium and large businesses) to buy-in to
its strategy and evidence suggests its efforts thus far have been fruitless in a country with strong
competition for influence in each front.
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4.2.Moderate Adoption Projects
4.2.1. T Cash- Indonesia
The Socio Economic Context
Indonesia's population of over 239 Million people makes it the world's fourth most
populous country and third in Asia only behind China and India (Central Intelligence Agency). It
is also home to the world's largest Muslim population. After decades of authoritarian rule, the
1990's saw Indonesia move towards democracy seeding the way towards a market economy.
Today it is one of the fastest growing major emerging markets with average GDP growth in the
last 5 years surpassing 5.7% (World Bank).
However, Indonesia continues to have one of the world largest poor population with over
120 Million people living under 2$ a day (World Bank). This creates a major challenge for the
Indonesian society: growing at a fast pace while making sure that the model of economic growth
allows for poverty alleviation. Rural population in Indonesia is over 46% and the country
depends on agriculture for 14% of its GDP and 38% of its massive labor force (Central
Intelligence Agency). Nonetheless, economic and financial reforms have made industry and
services grow rapidly throughout the archipelago.
Prospects for further economic growth are promising as the country continues to attract
foreign investment and to enact regulation that is suitable to the prosperity of the private sector.
It has smoothly sailed through the economic downturn in 2008 and is outperforming most of its
neighbors and creating competitive industries such as natural gas and textiles (Central
Intelligence Agency). Major challenges will be reducing corruption and revamping the
infrastructure needed to sustain growth.
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The Technological Context
The Telecommunications industry in Indonesia has grown impressively during the last
ten years expanding access to mobile phone to the majority of the population. Today the sector
grows at over 33% and while land-lines and internet access continues to struggle, mobile access
thrives (Bank of America Merrill Lynch). MNO's have grown in terms of customers to reach
over 78% of the massive Indonesian population (World Bank). Five major companies control
88% of the market with incumbent Telkomsel owning 51% of market share. As the growth in
customer base slows down with penetration approaching 100%, this competitive market is
looking elsewhere for growth in revenue streams (Bank of America Merrill Lynch). This is
where mobile money becomes a plausible alternative.
Regulation has been welcoming to the concept of a cash-free society. Early in the last
decade authorities foresaw the need to let non-banks hold electronic money accounts for their
customers, which has paved the way for telecoms to get into the mobile money business
(CGAP). However, the same regulators have been slow to recognize the role of agents as a way
to expand access and have kept licensing requirements which are hard to comply with by small
agents.
The Demand for Financial Services
At the forefront of the measures taken by the current administration to foster economic
growth, has been a move towards introducing significant reforms in the financial sector, the use
of treasury bills, and capital market development and supervision (CGAP). This has led to a
significant growth in both reach and players in the commercial banking system. Bank Rakyat
dominates the market with an estimated 40% of all saving accounts in the country (35 Million
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accounts). It has also managed to stretch throughout the archipelago with a network of over
6,000 branches (CGAP).
However, growth in formal financial services would account for meager rates of access to
financial services to most of the poor population if it wasn't for rural banks. The rural bank
network is estimated to have over 1,800 informal banking institutions. This helps explain why
Indonesia has one of the highest composite access to financial services in the sample of analyzed
countries at 40% (Honohan). At the same time, CGAP deems that "Access is highly skewed to
urban areas, and only 20-34 percent of rural households have access to banking services"
(CGAP). A major challenge for the formal banking sector continues to be to expand access and
capture the opportunity of underserved demand filled by rural banks, throughout an archipelago
that makes investment in branch infrastructure a costly task.
The T Cash Ecosystem
To be able to tap into the opportunities highlighted above, Telkomsel launched its bet on
the mobile money scheme in November 2007 with T Cash. The service permits users to hold an
electronic money wallet in their phones which can then be used to pay bills and merchants across
the country. The registration process requires an SMS and a visit to a cash-in agent to comply
with know your customer regulations. The overall ecosystem is heavily reliant on a large base of
260 merchant partners which allow people to pay with their electronic wallet. Telkomsel has
invested heavily in broadening the reach of its partner network, which now includes major
brands such as Garuda Airline, most electricity carriers and Indomaret retail network (IFC).
The Outcome
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T Cash has failed to see the adoption rates that have been exemplified by other products
across the world. Reports places its adoption figures ate 4.7 Million users or slightly less than 2%
of the Indonesian population (The Jakarta Post). Furthermore it is reported that only 100.000 of
those customers actively uses the platform to consistently pay for services. Two issues could be
identified as key to the lack of growth for such a service.
- Although in 2010 the company applied and received a license for peer-to-peer transfers, it is
only recently and unsuccessfully that T Cash has been able to offer such a service. In a country
of vast amounts of rural population and with banking heavily concentrated in the cities, peer-to-
peer transfers could to be the catalyst that it has been in other countries. Furthermore, regulation
limits the ability of T Cash to increase adoption through this new service. The Bank of Indonesia
requires all agents to have cash-out capability to get the same kind of license that Telkomsel got
only last year, a daunting task for a small rural shop (IFC). This has led the company to have a
meager 2.08 agents for every 100.000 people.
- Having an ecosystem mainly reliant on partners, the company has shied away from really
connecting with the needs of the unbanked in Indonesia who barely have access to Airlines and
from which only over 30% have access to electricity (IFC). Aggravating the situation is the fact
that in most of the stores where it offers the service it is directly competing with the formal
banking sector which, as has been analyzed, is better off than in most Asian and African
countries. Furthermore, the banks themselves are devising mobile money strategies which could
leverage their network of POS and ATM's (Indonesia has 13 ATM's per every 100.000 people)
further outpacing Telkomsel in terms of contact points with customers (World Bank).
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The lack of ubiquity seriously hampers the product's ability to generate the kind of
network effects that are key to multiplying adoption rates. This is especially true considering the
lack of a ubiquitous peer-to-peer transfer service that can rival informal remittances methods
such as money changes and currier services. In this environment regulation prevents Telkomsel
to leverage one of their key strengths as an MNO: its airtime distribution network. For many
analysts it will take an alliance with a major bank or a major regulatory reform to help T Cash
have significant impact (Rosenberg).
4.2.2. T Cash - Haiti
The Socio Economic Context
According to the Human Development Index Haiti is the poorest country in the Western
Hemisphere (World Bank). Its impoverished population, 54% of which lives in abject poverty,
has struggled to survive after decades of political instability violence and natural misfortunes.
Only in the last decade Haitians have been through a major earthquake, a violent political
conflict and a significant public health crisis.
This has left the country's economic structure in dire conditions. Its economy depends on
agriculture which accounts for 25% of GDP and over 60% of the jobs (Central Intelligence
Agency). Most of this agricultural output comes from small farming and is highly unstable
because of lack of infrastructure and propensity to weather conditions. The government depends
on foreign aid and international remittances for about half of the public budget. Although the
percentage of people living in rural areas of 50% is lower than that of African countries, the
earthquake made situation in the capital Port au Prince precarious with shortage of access to
basic services.
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The Technological Context
The Haitian Telecommunications industry suffers from some of the same constrains and
limitations of most industrial sectors. Although exhibiting recent growth it still struggles to gain
access to most of the population. With a meager increase in access (before the earthquake) in
2009 of only 4pp and the sector growing at 5%, penetration is well below the average of the
region at 37.8% (World Bank). However, the intense competition between the two major MNOs
is encouraging and is often seen as a good sign for the prospects of improved access to mobile
technology in the country. Digicel dominates the sector with 66% of market share, followed by
Viola Comcel which is reported to have more than 1 Million customers (Garcia Arabehety).
Such a situation of dire needs for financial services, a small an unresponsive banking
industry and a more competitive telecom sector has highlighted the need to embrace mobile
money schemes after the Earthquake. Such a need was envisioned not just by the major players
but also by international organizations with Bill and Melinda Gates foundation and USAIDS
offering $ 2.5 Million to the first mobile wallet product in the country (Garcia Arabehety).
The Demand for Financial Services
The political and environmental situation in Haiti has been un-conductive to investment
from abroad as well as to the establishment of a cohesive and consistent public policy to promote
economic growth. The banking sector is a reflection of its instability having only five banks in
the country with combined net income of only 33 Million USD. This has resulted in an alarming
lack of access to financial services with only 15% of composite penetration of financial services,
1.64 branches by every 100.000 people and less than 60 ATM's in the whole country. As the
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country still struggles to find its footing, it is yet to implement measures that would attract the
international capital needed to have an adequate financial system.
The demand for financial services is latent and aggravated by crisis situations. Most of
the foreign aid that comes into the country and which represents a sizable part of the economy,
struggles to find productive uses as the lack of banking infrastructure raises transaction costs and
increases risk. Identifying the potential of financial services to emerge as a catalyzer for post-
crisis USAID and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have been active in developing
initiatives to counter the high demand gap. Its president for the Global Development program has
stated: "Making financial services widely available to the poorest families in the developing
world can help break the cycle of poverty by giving them a safe place to save, guard against
risks, build assets, and provide opportunities for the next generation" (Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation).
The T Cash Ecosystem
T Cash was launched in late 2009 by the second largest operator in Haiti Voila in an
attempt to keep up with the launch of a similar product called Tcho Tcho Mobile by market-
leader Digicel. Being somewhat recent there is not a lot of documentation from Haiti on some of
the key strategic elements that define these new services. However from specialized articles,
reports and an interview some conclusions can be made about what has been the focus of Voila
with the service.
In order to fill the gap of knowledge of financial services and produce synergies in IT
infrastructure Voila established an alliance with the largest bank in Haiti Unibank. Furthermore
the company has worked hard in deploying a comprehensive network of agents to deliver the
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value proposition of ubiquity in a country with a low penetration of bank branches and ATM's.
Customers can register at any of those agents and Viola provides 24 hour customer support.
Reportedly, the company also invests in training agents in Know Your Customer requirements
before it accredits them, so focus on security and fraud-avoidance is exhibited by the system
(Garcia Arabehety).
One of the key stakeholders in the ecosystem has been humanitarian aid NGO's.
Agreements have been made to perform transfer of humanitarian funds through the platform as
well as rewarding employees and volunteers. Finally, it has also been reported that both
companies have decided in a low-cost strategy to make sure they reach the bottom of the
pyramid (Garcia Arabehety). Sending money through T Cash is considerably cheaper than
alternative in other countries as well as when compared to other informal means of money
transportation. Particularly in the case of T Cash a "mini wallet" feature allows customers to
activate the wallet without having to visit an agent, which has significantly increased adoption
rates (Haiti Libre).
The Outcome
After the first full year of operations Voila managed to get more than 300.000 users to
perform more than 3 million transactions. As previously stated Voila has an estimated 1 Million
customers, which makes the adoption rate considerably high at over 30% of its customer base in
just one year (Haiti Libre). Although it has fewer customers than competitor Tcho Tcho mobile
(with 450.000 subscriptions) it has managed to create a larger network of agents at 1.339 in
2010. As in other cases Peer to Peer transactions have dominated in terms of customer
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preferences and have been the key driver for growth. This speaks of early growth and a country-
wide trend of rapidly increasing penetration of mobile money.
The early success of the initiative can be attributed to some of the external above-
mentioned factors. The active financial and regulatory encouragement by authorities and NGO's
has made the roll-out efforts run smoothly for Viola. Similarly NGO's involvement in disbursing
relief funds through the platform has acted as a catalyzer. On the other side, key decisions as
focus on agent-network development can be considered a cornerstone for success. A
commissioning structure that encourages both adoption and usage is referred to by some of
Voila's leaders (interviewed by this thesis) as a relevant enabler of agent growth. Latent demand
for the services coupled with rapid roll-out of the agent infrastructure seems to have T Cash on
the way of becoming a success case for Mobile Money.
4.2.3. M Pesa - Tanzania
The Socio Economic Context
Per capita income places Tanzania as one of the world's poorest nations (World Bank).
After ending a long period of one-party ruling it has sought to use stability to entice international
investors with not much success. It is rural nation having over 70% of the population living
outside major cities and relying mostly on agriculture. Agricultural produce, highly susceptible
to weather conditions, accounts for more than one-quarter of GDP, as well as 85% of exports and
80% of the work force (Central Intelligence Agency).
However, recent years have seen rapid growth through the expansion of the private sector
and the increase in commodity prices. The economy has grown at an impressive 6.95% average
rate in the last five years, and expansionary monetary policy helped the country doge the
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recession. Tanzania is the third largest African producer of gold, and other minerals such as
diamonds, coal, iron, uranium, are seen as potential sources of massive revenue for Tanzania.
Furthermore tourism is on the rise and it is seen to have an important role in the economy in
coming years. These developments place the country on track to become a diversified economy
which explains why the atlas of economic complexity predicts it will be the second country in
the world that will grow the most in the coming 8 years (Hausmann and Hidalgo).
The Technological Context
There is great disparity between Tanzania and its neighbors when it comes to adoption of
telecommunication services. Whereas Uganda and Kenya saw significant and consistent growth
during the past 10 years, Tanzania's telecoms invested poorly and did not reach for rapid
expansion of access. In 2009 when Tanzania and Uganda passed the 40% penetration threshold,
Tanzania was at a meager 28%. In 2010 there were 46.5 subscriptions for every 100 people and
only 65% of people were physically covered by network connectivity (World Bank).
However, there is reason to believe that improvement is underway. Regulators in 2006
made an effort to increase competitiveness substantially bringing the total number of operators to
ten. Investment in telecom is expected to increase as the country continues its trend of stability
and economic growth, and analysts recorded that Tanzania was one the countries with the most
growth in the telecom sector in the world in 2010 with over 42% (Bank of America Merrill
Lynch).
The Demand for Financial Services
Banking reform is seen to have had a role in the growth the country has experienced in
the last ten years. Opening up the country has induced more competition and the entering of
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foreign players such as Barclays and Citigroup. The market is now characterized by a few big
players and several small local banks with a high level of competitiveness (Tanzania Invest).
However, the growth in the banking sector has not trickled down to Tanzania's massive
poor population. Tanzania's composite measure of financial access places it last amongst the
countries analyzed in this thesis with only 5% (Honohan), and FinScope surveys say that 54% of
the country is financially excluded having no access to formal or informal financial products
(FinScope). Demand will continue to rise as the country's appetite for diversification and
economic growth will need a sound financial services industry to work.
The M Pesa Ecosystem
Only a year after Safaricom (partly owned by the United Kingdom's telecom powerhouse
Vodaphone) introduced M Pesa in Kenya, Vodacom Tanzania (also affiliated with Vodaphone)
stoke a deal to launch its own version of M Pesa in the neighboring country. The product would
build on M Pesa's spectacular success in Kenya and address the need of a similar population:
highly unbanked, highly rural and with a remarkable demand for basic financial services
(Camner, Pulver and Sj6blom).
In many ways the product and its ecosystem resembled many of the features that the original
M Pesa had:
e Worked through an extensive network of Mobile Money agents built based on the
MNO's pre-existing Airtime distribution network.
" Focused on peer-to-peer remittances, although Vodacom went live also including
merchant payments, airtime top-up and loan repayments.
" Easy registration process with just an ID at any agent.
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The Outcome
Although optimism surrounded the launch, M Pesa Tanzania has failed to see the rapid
adoption rates that its sister Safaricom saw. After the first year of operation M Pesa Tanzania had
only 280.000 users, when during the same period M Pesa Kenya managed to draw over 3
Million. Today (2010 estimates) the product has surpassed the 3 Million user threshold still far
from the expected growth rate (Camner, Pulver and Sj6blom). This level of adoption (considered
moderate in this thesis) could be attributed to both external factors and failed strategies
implemented by Vodacom.
As said previously competition for market share in Tanzania's telecom has been fierce in the
last few years. Furthermore the example of M Pesa in Kenya made other Tanzanian MNO's
interested in launching similar products. Therefore, although it was amongst the first, M Pesa
Tanzania is now competing with other 3 mobile money products. This means that it not only
needs to struggle for customer attention and engagement, but also that convincing agents will
continue to be difficult. Furthermore, although the registration process is simple enough, unlike
in Kenya and Paraguay, there is no standard Identification system for citizens which limits
adoption rates.
On the other hand, in trying to copy M Pesa's model for Kenya, Vodacom made some costly
errors. Although it aimed for a ubiquitous agent network, the reality was that Vodacom had
limited leverage with a highly concentrated market for major airtime dealers. As an alternative it
looked to establish direct relationship with agents which significantly reduced its capacity to
scale. Although they eventually corrected this, today M Pesa Tanzania has only 10 agents per
100.000 people whereas M Pesa Kenya has 54 (Camner, Pulver and Sj6blom). Similarly, it is
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often said that the marketing strategy of Vodacom was insufficient and mistaken. It appears to
have positioned the services targeting students and book readers which do not exactly represent
the unbanked. Lacking the top of mind and favorable attitudes that market hegemon Safaricom's
brand had, it made it hard for customers to relate to the new product and know more about it
(Camner, Pulver and Sj6blom).
4.3.High Adoption Projects
4.3.1. SmartMoney - Philippines
The Socio Economic Context
Philippines is a rapidly growing developing economy which has benefited greatly from
the economic boom of most Asian nations. It has grown at a pace of 4.7% in the past ten years
and having left the current economic crisis behind its 2010 growth figure was an impressive
7.63% (World Bank). However, Philippines continues to struggle to breach the historic gap
between the rich and the poor. Over 42% of people in Philippines live under 2$ a day, higher
than the East Asia and Pacific average of 39%. This has led to unequal distribution of wealth
calling for a conscious attempt from governments to promote more inclusion and an approach to
development that focuses on the poor. Such a vision is sustained by many national and foreign
corporations which have looked for innovative ways to tap into the bottom of the pyramid.
It is also worth noting that because of the strong immigration of Filipinos abroad that
occurred in the late twentieth century, the country has a sizable diaspora. It is estimated that
around 11 Million Filipinos live abroad which accounts roughly for 11% of the total population
(Frialde and Mendez). Since a lot of those immigrants have been able to find legitimate working
opportunities, the remittances corridor to Philippines is one of the most important in the world.
Today, only India, China and Mexico surpass Philippine's total remittances of over $17.3 billion.
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This accounts for more than 10% of the country's GDP, making it an important driver for the
economy (World Bank).
The Technological Context
In Philippines, rather than the banks, the Mobile Network Operators have been the first to
realize the needs of unbanked customers. The sector has grown rapidly in the last ten years and
today mobile services reach over 99% of the Filipino population. Globe Telecom and Smart
Communications dominate the market, with the later having a customer base of over 45 Million
or 47% of the population. Such a competitive situation has not only conducted to the growth of
the sector as a whole but also to the development of incentives to innovate in order to gain
market share.
The growth of telecommunication services has also underlined a massive uptake of other
services associated with the mobile phone. Most notably text messages are remarkably popular in
the Philippines which is deemed by CGAP as the "texting capital of the world" with over 30
Billion text messages sent every day and over 1.000 per user per month (CGAP). This paints a
picture of a country increasingly familiar with mobile phone technology beyond the basic voice
features, which provides a fertile ground for the development of mobile money initiatives.
The Demand for Financial Services
It is widely acknowledged that the Filipino Banking industry has advanced significantly
in the last 10 years through progressive government policies. This has encouraged competition
amongst many banks with the top three banks only taking approximately 42.5% of the total
market share in assets (Beshouri and Gravrak). In such a competitive market Banco de Oro has
risen steadily year to year to become Philippines largest bank. Metrobank is a close second, and
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interestingly enough both major banks are involved with mobile money efforts. This is partly due
to their inability to reach the bottom of the pyramid in a country where financial services
penetration is approximately 26%, meaning that over 69 Million Filipinos still have inadequate
access to financial services (Honohan).
Such a massive amount of excluded people have found a way to carry on economic
activity without the help of the banks. This has led to the proliferation to a large informal. CGAP
analyst estimate that "Ninety-eight percent of unbanked Filipinos receive their income in cash,
and they overwhelmingly use informal savings instruments, such as saving at home in a safe
hiding place, giving money to a friend or family member to hold, or joining a savings club"
(Pickens). Prawn shops have also become ubiquitous in the country providing an expensive way
to get loans and emergency liquidity. Such a large informal sector highlights unmet demand for
adequate financial services which could reduce costs and risk to the users and provide them with
more technologically-advanced solutions.
The SmartMoney Ecosystem
Being the strongest player in the market Smart looked to invest in developing new
technologies and value added services to attract more customers. It developed its now famous
SmartMoney product in 2001 when the audience of mobile money advocates did not exist. It was
competitive pressure and a focus on innovation that led the company to try to tap into the unmet
demand for financial services being unaddressed by the banks. Its first motivation was to take
part of the multibillion dollar remittances corridor. At the same, it planned on leveraging its
brand name into partnerships with important players to establish a service that would take
advantage of an encouraging regulatory environment.
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Firstly, it made a partnership with Banco de Oro, today the largest bank in the country, to
make sure it backed the e-money accounts it would use. Later, it joined forces with MasterCard
in order to tap into its POS network, issuing a type of debit card associated with each smart
money account.
The Outcomes
In 2011 SmartMoney was estimated to have more than 8.5 Million customers, almost
reaching the remarkable barrier of 10% of the population. This makes it one the most successful
projects in the world. Although it's taken over ten years to reach that threshold, its growth has
been consistent through the years and it has managed to sort through competitive pressure to
continue to up-sale to its customer base.
Reasons for its impressive success point to various factors. One of the most important
elements of Smart's strategy is its capacity to leverage its existing retail network of airtime top-
ups. Such a network is massive: over 1 Million retailers who Smart continuously works on
convincing to joining as a SmartMoney agent. On the other hand, the large market for
international and domestic remittances has allowed Smart to develop a far-reaching value
proposition as a secure and more convenient service than established players such as Western
Union. The remittances service has generated network effects in users who are incentivized to
convince other members of their social network to join when they need to exchange money.
Another element fueling the growth of Smart is the competitive pressure in place by its rival
Globe which came out with a product of its own in 2004. Today it is estimated to have reached
the 1 Million user barrier and it has developed more inclusive tactics and technologies such as
opening an account through the sms platform as well as making further use of an extensive
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network of agents to do cash in and cash out. This has made Smart move into the development of
more innovative ways to interact with its customers and increase adoption. Some of those
include its partnerships with Banco de Oro as well as Mastercard which are seen as innovative by
a portion of the market.
However, Smart's success story is not without its detriments. Although forward-looking
regulation has allowed them to grow it has also placed two important roadblocks on the way:
e It requires a long paperwork process to let small business become mobile money agents.
Such a process has deterred Smart's incentives to work with agents at all, requiring
customers to go to bank branches or Smart customer centers as well as ATM's.
Additionally, the network of POS has been the focus of Smart's retail payment product,
forgoing the possibility of going beyond such a network to include smaller merchant in
rural areas. This also explains why only 8,000 airtime retailers have become part of the
network.
. Its Know Your Customer requirements also involve paperwork to do some transactions as
well as to open account. This has led Smart to develop a process that involves website
activation and a visit to a bank branch or Smart store. Again, these are processes poorly
aligned with the strategy of reaching the unbanked poor.
Smart's potential to continue to grow is still there for the pioneer of Mobile money in Asia. It
will have to work with regulators to streamline adoption processes in the light of attracting more
low-income customers. A CGAP study highlights that only 26% of Mobile Money customers are
poor. However the same study suggests that adoption potential is high because of high
confidence in MINO brands and rising awareness: "64 percent of respondents are aware of at
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least one mobile money product, overall they are 25 percent more likely to know the brand name
of an MNO than a bank, and 75 percent think mobile money would be easy to use" (Pickens). If
Smart is able to endure competitive pressure it is likely to tap into latent demand, relying on
cross-side network effects to continue to expand.
4.3.2. Tigo- Paraguay
The Socio Economic Context
Paraguay is the poorest country in South America. Its per capita GDP for 2010 was only
$ 5.152, less than half of that of its neighbors Brazil ($11.127), Argentina ($15.893) and
Uruguay ($14.277) (World Bank). However, for the last ten years it has enjoyed political
stability which has allowed them to grow and to develop certain sectors of the economy. An
important catalyst has been its trade terms with fellow Mercosur countries which have allowed
the country to benefit from trading to larger markets in Argentina and Brazil. After been
severally hit by the recession, 2009 saw record-breaking growth for Paraguay at over 15%
(World Bank).
For the same reason agriculture continues to dominate the economy. Paraguay is the sixth
largest soy producer in the world, much of which goes towards exports to its Mercosur partners
(Central Intelligence Agency). At the same time, Paraguay is often touted with having a high
level of informal economy. Re-exports of manufactured products account for a sizable part of the
economy. This has resulted in a country that is poor, rural and unequal. The dependency on
agriculture has left Paraguay with over 38% of rural population, considerably higher than the
average of Latin America (20%). Its GINI coefficient makes Paraguay the 16th most unequal
country in the world (Central Intelligence Agency).
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The Technological Context
The situation of Telecommunications in Paraguay has been characterized by strong
growth on mobile services to make up for the lack of other services such as landlines and the
internet. The country has a state owned monopoly over the fixed line business which explains
that penetration is only around 5% (BuddeComm Reports). The same company has a near
monopoly over ADSL services, which has also lead to one of the lowest broadband penetrations
in Latin America. Even computers are scares in Paraguay, with reports saying that less than 10%
of the population has personal computers.
This situation has placed the more competitive and privatized mobile business in a unique
place to enhance the reach of its services and capitalize growth opportunities. There are four
major companies dominating the industry, with Millicom's Tigo as the market leader
(BuddeComm Reports). Growth has allowed the country to reach an approximate 87% of mobile
penetration with the shortcomings of the fixed broadband helping rapid growth of mobile
broadband uptake (World Bank).
During the first years after the launch of the first mobile money service, both the Central
Bank and the banking regulator decided to take a "wait-and-see" approach to regulating the
sector (Tellez and McCarty). Only in 2010, two full years after the first launch, was some
regulation introduced to regulate things like electronic remittances, branchless banking and
correspondents.
The Demand for Financial Services
Paraguay has been part of the regional trend to show friendliness to the banking sector in
order to fuel the economy. However the growth of the banking industry has not coincided with a
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significant increase of access by the large low-income population of Paraguay. The country
boasts one of the lower ratios of bank branches per 100.00 inhabitants in the region and checking
accounts only reach approximately 10% of the population (World Bank).
The lack of access to adequate and modern financial services has created a relevant
informal banking sector. Cooperatives and communal banks have proliferated in the province, to
help people get access to credit. At the same time, because of the large rural population bus
drivers have filled the gap in assisting people with domestic remittances (Tellez and McCarty).
Wide-spread government recognition of the importance of advancing financial access to
the poor has taken places in the last few years. Paraguay's minister of Finance has often been
quoted saying that "Financial inclusion is a key objective in the design of domestic economic
policy" and most regulators have identified mobile banking as a key driver in that financial
inclusion strategy (Tellez and McCarty).
The Giros Tigo Ecosystem
Market-leading Tigo launched its first mobile money products in 2008. The initial bet
was placed on mobile merchant payments with a product named Tigo Cash. The company sought
to develop and leverage a large network of retailers who would accept Tigo Cash. However
adoption levels were disappointing mainly because of complicated registration mechanisms as
well as inadequate marketing support (Tellez and McCarty).
In the process of re-assessing its mobile money efforts Tigo looked to the opportunity
provided by the large remittances corridor. The product was redesigned and re-launched with the
name Giros Tigo in 2010 (Tellez and McCarty). Leveraging its network of airtime distribution
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and its current relationships with merchants, Giros Tigo's value proposition would be to provide
a convenient way to transfer money from many locations through the use of mobile phones.
The Outcome
Recent 2011 estimations place the number of users over 627 thousand Paraguayans which
means Tigo is approaching the 10% of the population barrier (Dalmasso). Tigo's approach is
plausible in being able to tap into market particularities to achieve growth and connect with
customer needs:
- It realized the size of the remittances corridor, in a country with such a large rural population
and it devised an option for an over the counter service that would better fit the cultural
resistance of sending money with no intermediaries.
- It used the relationships built with merchants either through its previous failed services or its
top-up distribution network, to develop a well-managed agent network that would help put in
place the over the counter service.
- It realized that most of the country had already formal ID numbers, identified the friendly
approach of the regulators and leveraged its existence customer database to put in place a no
frills mechanism to register for an account. Through the use USSD technology the customer can
activate the services in approximately 45 seconds, which has been a key driver of uptake (Tellez
and McCarty).
- It learned from past mistakes of under-investing in consumer insights and marketing support.
The new service and its marketing strategy was backed by far-reaching customer knowledge and
deployed massively to rapidly increase awareness.
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It is, however, yet to be seen how much Tigo can increase adoption rates through these
services and whether or not it can use its initial user base to grow the portfolio of banking
services it envisions. The company partnered with Visi6n Banco, an institution known in
Paraguay for its push to grow in the SME sector (Tellez and McCarty). The objective of the
partnership is to eventually move into more complex financial services such as bill payments,
insurance and microloans. In that pursuit it will face competition as rival Claro enters the field.
4.3.3. M Pesa - Kenya
The Socio Economic Context
Since the mid 1990's governments in Kenya have pursued an agenda of economic
liberalization supported by the IMF and the World Bank. Today, Kenya is oftentimes regarded as
Eastern Africa's hub for Financial, Communication and Transportation services (Central
Intelligence Agency). During the last 10 years it has out-paced its African neighbors in terms of
economic growth 4.55% to 2.93% (East Africa average). The idea of a modern and harmonious
Kenya has positioned in the minds of many not only in Kenya but across Africa and the world.
The growth in the service sector, which is already 65% of GDP, is expected to increase at
a pace of over 5.5% in the next five years and will rely mostly on telecommunications and
tourism (Central Intelligence Agency). However, the country still relies heavily on agriculture.
Agriculture and livestock are still very important as they account for 24% of the country's output
and over 50% of its exports. The main products are horticulture and tea, both accounting for
large parts of the labor markets. This helps explain why 77% of the people in Kenya still live in
rural areas and why over 49% of the Kenyans live in poverty (World Bank).
The Technological Context
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Like many other sectors mentioned above, the telecommunications industry has also seen
impressive growth. The Economist Intelligence Unit reckons that "the prodigious expansion of
telecommunications, has been a major engine of growth, and its share of GDP rose to 60%" (The
Economist). At the expense of a small and inefficient fixed-line service in the hands of a poorly-
ran state-owned company, mobile telephony has risen to become ubiquitous, with over 57% of
Kenyans owning a mobile phone (The Economist). At the heart of such growth has been the
most important player in the industry: Safaricom. The major telecom, partly owned by
Vodaphone, controls over 70% of the mobile market and enjoys a close relationship with
regulators and government agencies (Suri and Jack).
The government has foreseen the involvement of Safaricom with the process of
advancing financial inclusion. This has resulted in a regulatory "wait-and-see" approach.
Telecom operators have been able to experiment with banking services with some leniency from
the government. This has helped to speed up uptake and encourage innovation.
The Demand for Financial Services
After the 1990's saw the weakening of a banking sector burdened with inefficient state
control, reforms have been made to try to modernize the industry in Kenya. Today a more
developed banking sector exists and it has benefited from large amounts of investments that the
country has attracted. Competition has also increased sharply during the last years, paving the
way for innovative ways to increase access to financial services.
However, banking penetration continues to be low suggesting high demand. According to
The Economist Intelligence unit "only about 10% of Kenyans potentially eligible for bank
accounts actually have them, largely because of the high costs and stringent conditions" (The
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Economist). Furthermore access to banking services has traditionally been done through
branches. Due to the high proportion of rural population Banks have hesitated in the growth of
branch capillarity leaving Kenya with only 4 branches for every 100.000 people (World Bank).
Demand continues to be unmet and the country will need a stronger, more inclusive financial
sector if it wants to see its forecasted economic growth translate into poverty alleviation.
Tied to the economic structure of the country is the increasing need for people in the
cities to send money to the vast and unproductive rural areas of the country. This makes up for
unmet demand for formal remittance services. A GSMA study found that 58% of people in
Kenya moved money personally from one area of the country to the other with the second
method being popular Buses with 27% (Camner, Pulver and Sj6blom). The situation before the
introduction of mobile money was highly unproductive and risky, for a service that is seen as
vital for the survival of rural areas.
The M Pesa Ecosystem
M Pesa is widely acknowledged as the most important and most successful mobile
money service in the world. Since its launch in 2007 by Safaricom its growth rates have been
staggering, surpassing year to year any analysts' expectations. In its first year of service from
May 2007 to May 2008, the average number of daily subscription rose from slightly over 1.000
to more than 12,000 (Suri and Jack). The success of M Pesa has inspired a lot of the new services
that are seen today as it has constituted itself into a common benchmark for this new industry.
Since the beginning, Safaricom sought to start its involvement with mobile money by
providing a simple value proposition for one of many services that have latent unmet demand in
Kenya. Its focus has been on domestic remittances in order to take advantage of the corridor
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existing between cities and rural towns. Hence, Safaricom has been able to base most of its
marketing and execution in the basic slogan of "Send Money Home". In order to deploy the
service it has leveraged its airtime distribution network in order to achieve ubiquity.
Leveraging the success of M Pesa, Safaricom has moved on to start deploying more
comprehensive financial services through the existing platform. In 2010 it launched its new
product M Kesho which, in partnership with Kenya's largest bank Equity, provides M Pesa
customers the possibility to have a savings account, short term loans and micro-finance products.
By the end of 2010 M Kesho had over 600,000 users.
The Outcome
Latest reports locate the number of M Pesa users at about 12 Million users or 26% of the
Kenyan population (GSMA) . Safaricom's approach to developing the service has been studied
by many. It can certainly be said that the company played to its strengths in developing not only
a new innovative service but a technological ecosystem that would encourage fast adoption and
usage in many ways. Such an approach has been the main growth driver and it can be synthetized
in four main strategies:
- Agent management: being a top-up focused mobile operator Safaricom spent heavily on
sustaining a far-reaching network of agents that would sale airtime. This allowed them to have a
rather simple mechanism in place to convert a portion of those agents to do the cash-in and cash-
out activities required to support M Pesa. It developed a simple but attractive commissioning
model that would make sense for agents and it leveraged its existing supervision know-how to
have tight control over them. As the service became popular, the incentives for agents to become
part of the network increased steadily. Safaricom has managed to effectively grow its agent
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network to more than 18, 0000, and it has done so in a way in which it could support the growth
in users (Camner, Pulver and Sj6blom).
- Handset Technology: having over 70% of the market Safaricom leveraged the software side of
the service effectively. Customers would not need any type of SIM swap to use it and once the
service rolled-out practically any Safaricom customer could register right away (Camner, Pulver
and Sj6blom). This eased-up a key part of the mobile money process: registration. M Pesa's
seamless registration process involves a sms interaction and a simple ID at the agent to get things
going. This is widely acknowledged as a key driver of fast up-take.
- Branding: Safaricom's brand has traditionally been well regarded in Kenya. Again, leveraging
the reach of its mobile operation it pulled from the strength of a brand that oftentimes is regarded
as a symbol for modernity in Kenya (Camner, Pulver and Sjdblom). This context was key for an
experienced team of branding and marketing that new how to transmit service features to its
customers. Building on those strengths Safaricom was able to communicate the most important
attribute of its service: ease of use.
Challenges for M Pesa continue to evolve. It will increasingly face competition from new
entrants recognizing the value that Safaricom has discovered. Furthermore, its ability to manage
its partnership with Equity Bank to continue the process of upselling customers to more
comprehensive financial services is yet to be seen.
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5. Analysis and Discussion
This chapter aims at building on the previously-detailed projects to offer a comprehensive
comparative analysis of the most important qualitative and quantitative variables that define each
case's up-bringing and outcome. The idea is that the analysis emerging from the following
discussion establishes a basis for far-reaching conclusions to be outlined in the following
chapter. Most of what is argued in this chapter is based methodologically in the indicators table
shown in Appendix 1 and in the analysis table shown in Appendix 2.
5.1 The Impact of Financial Services Penetration
With the exception of Haiti, the penetration of mobile phone in the countries analyzed is
both large and growing rapidly. The figure bellow shows that even in countries like Tanzania
where penetration still does not reach 50% of the population, growth soars over 41% becoming
one of the most important sectors of the economy (World Bank).
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The continuity of growth in most markets and the fact that nations like Brazil, Paraguay
and the Philippines are already at developed-world levels, suggests an optimistic outlook for the
telecom sector in developing countries. Such atmosphere defines the moment in which all of the
projects analyzed in this thesis were launched.
In most cases, products were developed as a way to differentiate mobile phone offers
from competition, like in the case of Smart in Philippines or Tigo in Paraguay. In such situations
fierce competition has brought about incentives for innovation which have been met locally
rather than in some global headquarters. In other countries such as Indonesia or Kenya, mobile
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money also provided a way to control churn 3. For Safaricom it meant maintaining its large
customer base with a sticky service, whereas in the case of Temkomsel the saturation of the
telecom market moved it to act promptly to reduce attrition rates through the launch of T Cash.
The situation of the telecom market is important as it creates those incentives to invest in
technologies that are untested and where standards are far from being established. However, they
also determine how much MNO's are willing to look at opportunities in adjacent industries such
as banking. And the size of such an opportunity comes from looking at the outcome of some of
the mobile money projects in the light of the lack of access to financial services.
The figure bellow shows how projects in countries with high levels of access to financial
services have struggled to find its footing in the banking sector and show low adoption rates
today.
3 Customer churn is a common measure of the loss of customer for any given service customer. It reflects the
proportion of lost customers over the average customer base for any given period of time.
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Composite access to Financial Services vs Mobile Money Product Adoption
(GSMA 2011* and Honohan; 2007; Selected Countries Data)
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The most emblematic case is that of Brazil. Being, a pioneer in branchless banking
models which have had significant effects on poverty alleviation, they report disappointing
adoption figures on one of its more relevant mobile money projects. A similar situation occurs in
Sri Lanka, where the growth of eZ Pay has been limited by the company's inability to
differentiate the product from established banking options. At the same time the more successful
African examples in Kenya, have seized on remarkably low access to financial service to
position is services as the only alternative to financial inclusion.
Page 64
However, exceptions can provide meaningful examples as well. In the case of Uganda
and Tanzania lack of formal financial services has actually hindered its development of an Agent
network, which as discussed in section 5.3 is a key to success. Behind the network of agents,
formal bank branches have a role in providing liquidity and helping manage cash flows.
Similarly, relatively high financial access in the Philippines has made Smart explore many
product-enhancing opportunities that may pay off in the near future.
5.2 The importance of Regulation
With the only possible exception of Haiti, all of the countries in which the projects analyzed
took place have one regulatory trend in common: financial services reform. The last decade saw
these countries realize the importance of having a well-functioning financial sector in order to
achieve the level of economic growth they envisioned.
To some measure their efforts have paid off, as we see a high degree of economic growth
which has been backed and sustained by an increasingly competitive banking sector. However,
when it comes to access most countries have fared off remarkably low when compared to
developed nations. This suggests that, even though some efforts have been made throughout the
developing world to improve overall industry conditions for the banking sector, access is yet to
find its way to most of the population. As an indicator the figure shows that, with the exception
of Brazil, all of the countries involved show low levels of penetration of banking branches and
ATM's when compared to OECD members.
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Mobile money is set to build upon the progress being made in the banking sector in order to
substantially expand access. However, as in any new industry, the new sector will have to sort
through the lack of legislation and guidelines that is seen in most countries. Usually projects find
themselves somewhere in the middle of two extremes:
* Wait-and-see approach: exemplified by Kenya, in which regulators are vastly permissive
in dealing with the new technologies allowing the players to explore the feasibility of
these services and dictating guidelines once the service is launched and results and
impacts can be assessed.
* Ex Ante: most notably seen in the case of Indonesia, where national banking and telecom
regulators expect to have a fully functioning regulatory structure in place before allowing
new services to launch.
Regulation is important because it both (i) limits and conditions what the operator of the
service can actually offer and how it designs the services and (ii) it ends up determining the
U U
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mechanism by which the operator works to scale the use of the service. Taking those premises,
three key areas of regulation have been found to be relevant in the capacity of the selected
projects to launch and scale:
e Agent regulation: one of the relevant transformations that mobile money brings is the
idea that small businesses act as agents performing cash-in and (in some cases) cash-out
transactions. The way in which the activities of such agents are regulated is key to the
success of any mobile money projects. In the successful cases of Tigo, M Pesa (Kenya)
and Smart there have been heavy reliance on the network of agents precisely because
they have been regulated with flexibility. Regulators have recognized the importance of
the agent network in both expanding access to financial services and develop a new
source of revenue flowing in to local and rural shops. In the other side of the spectrum is
Indonesia's T Cash which has been prevented to establish a remittances product because
the difficulty of its agents getting licenses to perform cash-out transactions.
e Registration/ KYC: regulators usually place restrictions on what operators have to ask of
the client in order to register for the services. Guidelines on this issue are usually taken
from existing banking regulation. However since agents are usually the ones that perform
the registration process and since unbanked customers are targeted, KYC requirements
have to be flexible in order to ensure a smooth registration and to expand access. M Pesa
(Kenya) and Tigo both took advantage of the fact that only an ID card was needed and
most people had a government-issued ID. The same issue has limited the success of M
Pesa Tanzania where no standard identification mechanism exists.
e Need for Partnerships: because mobile money is found at the intersection of the banking
and telecommunication sectors, some regulators have pushed towards requiring some
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kind of partnership between MNO's and banks. In Africa telecoms have led the way and
had leniency to establish their networks with limited bank involvement. Although the
industry knowledge that banks bring to the table is relevant, there is operational
efficiencies in having a project led mainly by an MNO since it reduces the need for
agreement on strategy and for a somewhat bureaucratic decision-making process for
operations. In countries such as Brazil and Sri Lanka where bank involvement is
necessary, MNO's reliance on banks for infrastructure and investment has hindered its
ability to quickly react to the market and to move swiftly to increase adoption.
5.3 Designing the Ecosystem
A great deal of research has been done in recent years about the functioning of technological
ecosystems and digital platforms. Cusumano defines platforms as "a foundation technology that
is used beyond a single firm and brings together multiple parties together to solve a common user
problem" (Cusumano). He also argues that the value of the platform increases exponentially due
to network effects. The notion behind platform theory is that the more users join the most interest
it awakens from other firms or players to join in as well.
The mobile money ecosystems act substantially as platforms, drawing in several players
interested in the uptake of a massive amount of customers. Agents are the first obvious
beneficiaries. The more users the platform has the more transactions will a particular agent be
able to perform, increasing his revenue from the service. Formally the agent is a complementor
to the mobile money services and, in most cases, the service is far from being his single source of
revenue. However, his is interested in seeing the platform grow and, to a certain extent, will
work towards ubiquity.
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However, the agent is not the only party member of the ecosystem. In some cases like in
Philippines and Brazil, banks have a large stake in the projects as close partners. In others, like
Indonesia, the product revolves around retail payments making the interest of merchants very
much relevant to the success of the scheme.
This section builds on the previously-described examples and sheds light in the key issues
that have to be resolved to allow the project to scale.
Agent network:
The role of agents in the mobile money ecosystem cannot be overstated. It is their
functioning and the distinct cost structure that it defines for the whole systems that gives these
solutions the potential to broaden access to the unbanked.
The most obvious lesson from the projects observed is the fact that scaling up the agent
base is at the same level of importance as scaling up the base of customers. The following graphs
show how far-reaching network are a sign of high adoption projects:
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Emblematic M Pesa Kenya has placed growth in its base of agents a constant strategic
objective, which serves to explain its high penetration rate. Its neighboring African nations have
failed to reach the level of agent penetration, and in the case of Tanzania it is commonly
recognized by analysts to be a key constrain on growth (Camner, Pulver and Sj6blom). Similarly
Oi Paggo and T Cash (Indonesia) have less than the proportion of agents than region leaders
Tigo and Smart. The exception is eZ Pay with a substantial network. However, as noted in the
case description, little evidence of those agents' involvement can be found on-site, making the
statistics questionable.
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The growth of the agent network presents a typical "chicken and egg" problem often
found in Platform management literature: agents will not join if they don't see an attractive
market for users, and users are unable to use the service if there are no agents.
When questioned about how to resolve this strategic issue, industry leaders interviewed
for this thesis are convinced that MNO's have the unique position of leveraging existing top-up
distribution networks: "Our existing distribution networks are our assets". Normally such a
network involves major distributors that handle a large number of small agents. In the case of M
Pesa Kenya the network was heavily concentrated, which meant that to obtain buy-in the
company had to get the confidence of a handful of large distributors. This allowed it to "buy
time" guaranteeing a large availability of agents while the user base grew. Exactly the opposite
happened to M Pesa Tanzania where the lack of concentration made the company trying to
convince itself each small agent one by one.
Another key issue to assess is agent commissioning structure. Usually top-up
commissions are higher than mobile money commission. This is unlikely to change since low
costs are key to the success of mobile money. Therefore, other incentives such as bigger
commission for signing up customers and competition-style incentives have been seen in
successful cases and should be explored by the rest. When consulted about the key issues behind
its rapid success, an interviewee from T Cash's (Haiti) management is certain that
commissioning agents by both adoption and use is vital.
Bank Partnerships
As noted in the previous section many times regulators will force MNO's to partner with
banks to come up with some of these services. Partnership can work anywhere from establishing
Page 71
a simple trust account like in the early days of M Pesa Kenya or Tigo, to an all-out equity
partnership such as in Oi Paggo.
From the research performed there is no evidence to suggest that partnerships are
required for success or that they are deemed risky and bound for failure. Safaricom's market
power let it lead the way to record-breaking adoption rates with simple partnerships with various
banks. At the same time Smart's partnership with Banco de Oro has helped grow steadily and to
develop new value propositions. The lack of a strong partnership for T Cash in Indonesia has
delayed its launch of a remittances service, whereas in Sri Lanka the synergies envisioned with
bringing together the largest bank and the largest MNO has not translated into high adoption
because of flawed implementation.
In establishing partnerships MNO's and Banks should balance the reduced flexibility that
comes from working in join teams with diverging priorities, with the need to produce synergies
from each other's assets. If such a balance can be struck then a partnership will be successful.
However, if agreements prove unattainable, an argument can be made to establish open
ecosystems in which many banks can join and benefit from the same platform. This is consistent
with a broader view of platform management resembling strategies of famously successful
platforms such as Google, as well as with the view industry leaders such as Regueros.
Merchants
Since most of the projects that are being deployed and almost all of the ventures studied in
this thesis have relied heavily on remittances as a flag-ship product that has driven growth, little
documentation is found on effective strategies for managing a network of merchants that would
receive mobile money as a currency. A few hypotheses, based on the cases of Oi Paggo (Brazil),
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eZ Pay (Sri Lanka) and T Cash (Indonesia) can be further researched to better understand the
issue:
e There might be too small overlap between the type of merchants that are part of the
current air-time distribution network handled by MNO's and the merchants that would be
interesting for customers to use their mobile money in. This would require additional
efforts and costs in going out to find new merchants, thus forfeiting the chance of the
MNO to play into its competencies.
" Resistance can come from merchants who already have current payments mechanisms
that satisfy their needs or rather getting paid in cash. The case of Oi Paggo Brazil which
has worked with Cielo POS network suggests a way to overcome the issue. In this
process interoperability across MINO's may play a role, since merchants will resist having
various different devices for various systems.
" Commissioning structure may be ill-aligned with the interests of merchants. If payment
mechanisms such as debit or credit cards are established, mobile money will have to
compete in price with them at a late-mover disadvantage. If not, attractive schemes have
to be in place to convince merchants to forfeit part of their revenue because of the
convenience offered by the service.
MNO's have a role in aligning incentives to get merchants to join the ecosystems. Although
in section 5.4 an argument is made that a simple-feature approach is advisable to achieve scale,
this does not mean that eventually merchant payments can become a great source of additional
value to be extracted from larger bases of mobile money customers.
Other Partnerships
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Looking through the projects analyzed there is anecdotal evidence of interesting
partnerships that can potentially add value to users in the platform. Smart has been particularly
active in coming up with different applications to its SmartMoney product through a wide range
of partnerships.
The most important of those partnerships is with SmartMoney's agreement with
MasterCard, which now allows customers to get a debit card associated with their mobile money
accounts. The card can then be used in the very large network of POS where master card is
accepted as well as to cash-out in ATM's (Beshouri and Gravrak). However, MNO's should be
careful when working with card companies which could be more prone to see mobile money as a
threat than as an opportunity. Consultancies asked about the experience of the developed world
point to the big three card companies as some of the main roadblocks for innovation, countering
or sometimes stalling projects in which they are involved with.
With less success Airtel Uganda's approach to a cash-free ecosystem builds on a relevant
relationship less explored in mobile money literature: Business to Business. It has assembled
teams that work with companies to make sure that their mobile money technology is properly
used to add value to their businesses (Camner, Pulver and Sj6blom). M Pesa Kenya has started to
advise insurance institutions in their product development strategies towards low income
customers (Jenkins). Finally T Cash has been successful in leveraging its relationship with
NGO's to distribute aid through the platform using it as a catalyst for growth.
It is yet to be seen how much impact this partnerships will have in the process of
increasing uptake or expanding access to financial services. However, it is not hard to see how
the use of debit cards, the use of mobile money in pay-roll or the design of insurance products
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associated with this technology, can help increase the value of the platform and generate the
network effects needed to further expand.
5.4 Value Proposition Approach
As stated previously, mobile money can take the form of several services which it either
substitutes a current service or makes a day-to-day process easier by the use of technology. In the
case of the projects analyzed in this thesis there is a wide range of services offered by the MNO's
running these ventures. This section looks at the ways in which product offerings affect the
likelihood of success of the projects involved.
Theoretically the lack of financial access identified in most of these countries and discussed
in section 5.1 would make the most of the services offered attractive to low income users.
Domestic and International remittances, merchant payment mechanisms, loan repayments,
insurance and saving accounts, are all services that are either non-existent or ill-provided by the
informal sector which is risky and costly in most of the countries. In theory, the use of informal
services suggests that demand for such services is also there.
However, overwhelmingly successful products across the developing world have relied
heavily on one and only one service: domestic remittances. The figure bellow shows how the
aggregate adoption levels of project which have launch its mobile money scheme with
remittances as its top and most important service, is more than ten times that of those projects
based on retail payments.
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Anecdotally, T Cash Indonesia currently and unsuccessfully depends on merchant
payments for its mobile money scheme and is trying to enable a peer-to-peer product, and Tigo
Paraguay started by offering these services as a key feature before realizing that growth was on
remittances (Tellez and McCarty).
Understanding some of the explanations can help devise a guideline for product development
that could be followed by future projects:
Simplicity: since the unbanked are being targeted it needs to be understood that a basic
barrier of education has to be crossed in order for a user to take-up the services. Adoption
will in some measure depend on the capacity of users to understand why they should use
the services and how exactly can they do it. Thus, the importance of simplicity comes
into play. Agents, printed material, radio and television ads need to be able to quickly and
effectively sell the services and to explain the mechanisms that make it work (Davidson
Adopotion % by Main Product Offering
(GSM A nd erwrces';SekcldCountries Datt:201o-?tfj)
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and McCarty). This concept has pushed MNO's to come up with simple messages
centering its strategy on one particular service.
e Demand for Remittances: even though there is apparent demand for most financial
services, in countries with high level of rural population remittances become a highly
relevant features. In the end of the day a merchant payment mechanism substitutes cash,
but does not save the user a great deal of money or time in the way in which remittances
becomes a solution. The alternatives to remittances such as Bus drivers are a lot costlier
and riskier than the alternative to merchant payments.
e Marketing Limitations: other explanations could point to the lack or inappropriateness of
marketing strategies. Airtel Uganda has manifestly underspent in marketing to increase
awareness of its services and, eZ Pay Sri Lanka has failed and establishing a clear enough
value proposition and transmitting it to the customer. Part of these problems comes from
the fact that MNO's have traditionally used SMS as a cheap way to advertise value added
services to their customers. However, products as complex as the ones being launched on
mobile money platform need quite a bit more than an SMS to be understood, and
sustained promotional efforts have to take place to establish long-term awareness
(Davidson and McCarty).
e Banking Illiteracy: when it comes to analyzing uptake of other, more advanced financial
services products the education barrier becomes even higher. In that sense most MNO
place these services in a second stage of the product launch strategy. This is reasonable if
one considers that a customer who already uses some kind of financial services will be
easier to convince than one who continues to use only informal services.
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A successful case of a company that has up-sold a relevant portion of its mobile money users
to a different kind of service is yet to be seen. Although most companies analyzed offer more
than one service, information on penetration of each service is unavailable.
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6. Conclusions
After reviewing nine projects from Africa, Asia and Latin America, qualitative analysis helps
suggests answers to the two underlying objectives this thesis aimed at resolving: describing the
mobile money opportunity and identifying key elements that could potentially determine the
success or failure of a mobile money venture.
As discussed in Chapter 1 and 5.1 the opportunity of mobile money is determined by a
wide gap existing in most developing countries between access to financial services and access
to mobile telephony. Although generally companies aiming at that opportunity are favored by a
latent demand for financial services from potential low-income customers, enough financial
services infrastructure has to be in place in order to implement the services in the first place.
Hence, companies assessing the opportunity of mobile money should be sure to:
- Objectively asses the state of the telecom sector and understand possible competitive
pressures that may arise from the launch of the service. Unlike five years ago, today, the
emergence of mobile money is a global phenomenon and few countries are green fields for
pioneers in the way in which Kenya and Philippines were. And, as Gans and Stem would argue,
innovating in a competitive environment has entirely different characteristics than when pursuing
a disruptive strategy (Gans and Stem).
- Understand the size and depth of the opportunities in the access to financial services.
Although overall access may be low, trends towards financial inclusion go well beyond mobile
money and for an MNO to compete with a bank for financial services may be a steep hill to
climb.
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- Perform a comprehensive assessment towards understanding if there is a "threshold"
level of financial access that can be both (i) high enough to provide the basic infrastructure so
that an ecosystem can effectively be developed with the help of existing banks and (ii) low
enough so that cross-side competition from the financial industry does not make the product
competitively unfeasible.
On the other hand, the advent of mobile money projects taking place in so many countries
provides an opportunity to establish preliminary analysis on causes for success and failure.
Although obtaining data continues to be a challenge, this thesis discusses the relevance of three
particular strategies that are pivotal in order to have a successful mobile money implementation
once the opportunity has been validated.
First, Companies should work with regulators to establish an environment that is conductive
to the type of innovation needed to develop the mobile money ecosystem. Evidence shows that
regulation can be a major roadblock in the process of launching and growing a mobile money
venture. Different stages of development require diverse regulatory responses. In low adoption
countries the challenge is to find a way to structure guidelines for partnerships, signing-up
mechanisms and agent management schemes that permit enough flexibility to allow projects to
scale. In more developed mobile money countries regulators will seek to encourage competition,
empower customers and keep large players in check. In all of these cases remittances have
allowed the increase in penetration. However a new phase is underway in which more
comprehensive services are to be provided. In that process new partnerships have to be built and
the role of each player in the ecosystem has to be outlined. Regulators will have to balance the
need for rules to keep the new systems healthy, with the flexibility necessary to move towards
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increasing penetration of more financial services within the current base of mobile money
customers.
Secondly, the necessity of developing a comprehensive platform strategy for mobile
money ventures is clear. Much success will depend on the ability of companies to bring together
a large set of stakeholders to join their ecosystem. In this process the first and most important
step is to make sure that a strategy is in place to overcome the "chicken and egg" problem
particularly in the case of agents, allowing the ubiquity of contact points with users so necessary
for the rapid growth in customer base. Companies should look across the world to establish the
most suiting commissioning structure for its agents and make sure that an organizational
structure is in place to rapidly scale the base of agents. Similarly, financial institutions, NGO's
and government agencies can provide partnerships that could become catalysts for rapid uptake
and increasing usage.
Finally an incremental approach seems to be a plausible strategy to deal with product
development in mobile money. In most cases, given high demand, starting with remittances
provides a way to take advantage of same-side network effects which are at the heart of any fast-
growing platform strategy (Cusumano). Companies should opt to increase adoption by taking
simplicity as a premise and offering the service that has the most demand. Once network effects
are in place and a critical mass is reached, new services can be offered with the use of diverse
communication channels and marketing strategies.
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Appendix 1. Key Indicators Summary
Project Project Name - Socio Economic Context Technological Demand for Financial Services Project Outcome
Adoption Level Country Context
Low Adoption eZ Pay - Sri 49 5 8.01 29 21 85 68 34 0.3 59 10 9 59 6 07 0.32 14
Lanka
Oi Paggo -
Brazil 2,08
8 11.1 4.41 10 195 14 98 14 0.1 43 110 12 2.70 0 07 0.1 5
Airtel -
Uganda 17 1.26 7.39 33 0 87 40 22 0.2 20 0.45 2 9.80 5 09 0 12
Moderate T Cash -
Adoption Indonesia 0.2 13.4
707 4.29 5.71 51 240 46 79 33 0 40 4 7 4.70 1 07 2 2
T Cash - Haiti
0.1 27.1
7 1.10 0.85 72 10 50 38 6 0 15 0.58 2 6 15 10 4 13
M Pesa
Tanzania 0.2
23 1.42 6.95 88 45 74 47 41 0 5 2.63 2 2.00 0 08 7 10
High Adoption SmartMoney -
Philippines 0.3
200 3.94 4.78 45 93 34 92 22 0 26 13.3 11 0.20 12 03 9 9
Giros Tigo -
Paraguay 18 5.15 4.12 13 6 39 89 3 - 30 - 6 5.68 4 07 10 13
M Pesa -
Kenya 0.6
17 1.26 8.07 64 33 87 58 9 0 10 2.24 2 2.40 5 07 38 54
Indicators Description and Sources
Acronym Indicator Year Source Exception
GDP pp GDP per capita PPP (curent international $) 2010 World Bank
PHR Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% 2009 World Bank
of population)
PRA Rural population (% of total population) 2010 World Bank
BB Bank Branches per 100.000 people 2009 World Bank
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GSMA Movillion; Indonesia Data from 2011 TeleGeography
AP Aentsper100-W pkple2011 OS4
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Appendix 2. Summary of Qualitative Case analysis
Project Adoption Project Name - Socio Economic Context Technological Context Demand for Financial Project Features Project Outcome
Level Country Services
" Newfound stability
bringing about economic
growth
" Government directed
development focusing on
revamping infrastructure
" Rapid expansion of
mobile and internet
connectivity
" Highly competitive
telecommunications
sector
" Remarkably high
relative penetration of
savings account
" Large state-owned banks
with a mandate to
expand access
" Low penetration of other
services (credit card,
debit card, etc.)
" Large inflow of
international remittances
" Led by telecom market
leader in search of more
revenue and less
distribution costs
" Focus on retail and bill
payments
" Partnership with large
state-owned bank
* Low penetration of other
services (credit card,
debit card, etc.)
" Lack of a coherent
value proposition
" Un-clear targeting in a
country with high
banking penetration
" Lack of marketing
support and coherent
trade marketing
strategies
Oi Paggo - Brazil a Large, diversified e Less growth of * High growth of financial * Launched by the third * Regulators prevented the
economy with over a telecommunication sector fueling the growth largest operator in the company to go beyond
decade of stability and services after passing in the economy company. Little interest retail payments
economic growth 100% of penetration e Pioneer country in the by others * Had to compete with
" Significantly successful * MNO's focusing on data development of * Focused on retail established financial
poverty alleviation usages and smartphones branchless banking payments and competing institutions offering
strategies * Technologically models to target the poor in fees with credit card similar services for the
" Welcoming environment advanced banking sector companies poor
for foreign business with internet banking * Allied with Banco do e Lagged behind banks in
and high penetration of Brazil and used the Cielo agent penetration
ATM's POS network
" Projected to be one of
the highest-growing
countries in the world in
the next decade
" Heavily reliant on
agriculture with a high
proportion of rural
population. Most of
population is poor
e After lifting a
moratorium in 2007,
new banks have
flourished with foreign
capital
" Still behind East African
peers in financial access
" Liberalization has
brought about increases
in network capacity
" Penetration of both
mobile services as well
as to the internet
continues to be low
" Launched by the second-
largest operator reacting
to the imminent launch
of the market leader
" Conceived a cash-free
ecosystems searching for
agents who would both
work on remittances and
accept pay
" Worked heavily on B2B
initiatives
Lack of customer
awareness explains
meager growth
Ambitious agent strategy
has delivered low agent
penetration
Low Adoption eZ Pay - Sri
Lanka
Airtel - Uganda
Project Adoption Project Name - Socio Economic Context Technological Context Demand for Financial Project Features Project Outcome
Level Country Services
Moderate Adoption " Leveraging the fourth
largest population in the
world to achieve
sustained economic
growth
" Massive amounts of
poor population
" Promising prospects for
growth fueled by foreign
direct investment
" Fast growing telecom
industry expanding
access to most of the
population
" Regulators open and
encouraging the concept
of a cash-free system
" Significant reform has
introduced growth in the
financial services
industry
" Major banks have spread
infrastructure throughout
the archipelago
" Rural banks play a large
role in serving the poor
" Led by telecom market
leader in search of more
revenue and less
distribution costs
* Focus on retail and bill
payments
" Partnership with large
state-owned bank
* Low penetration of other
services (credit card,
debit card, etc.)
" Regulation got on the
way of launching a
relevant P2P product
" Partner network did not
exactly targeted the
unbanked poor and made
it compete with current
solutions rather than
bring something new
T Cash - Haiti e Poorest country in the * Inadequate technological * Lack of investment * Launched by the second * High penetration in very
western hemisphere infrastructure that is un- makes the financial largest operator in small time period
* Has been hit badly by conductive to investment industry small and with parallel to the launch of e Quickly deployed the
natural disaster, and entrepreneurship little potential for growth the market leader and largest agent network in
humanitarian crisis and e Behind Latin America in e Alarmingly low backed by foreign grant the country
political unrest penetration of mobile penetration of financial * Alliance with the largest 9 NGO's use the platform,
* Depends on foreign aid and fixed telecom services, branches and bank in the country which has acted as a
for much of the output services and internet ATM infrastructure e Focusing on remittances catalyzer
and potential for connectivity * Lack of banking limits with low fees o Favorable
development e High competition aid efforts commissioning structure
between two major for agents
MNO's
M Pesa Tanzania " End of one-party ruling
has brought about rapid
economic growth, and
prospects for further
growth are optimistic
" More than two thirds
still live in rural areas
and country depends on
unstable agriculture
" Behind its neighbors in
all measures of
connectivity
" Lack of investment on
recent years explain low
mobile penetration
" Recent regulatory
reforms have introduced
more competitively
which is likely to
improve growth figures
" Recently open banking
system has welcomed in
large international
players
" Still there is lack of
access to most of the
poor population
" Demand likely to rise as
the country continues its
path for growth
" Modeled to Kenya's
MPesa and launched by
an affiliated company
" Sought an extensive
agent network
" Focused on peer-to-peer
to capitalize on the rural
to urban corridor
" Easy registration process
" Did not deliver a large-
enough agent network
because of lack of agent
concentration which
hampered growth
possibility
" Had to face intense
competition from 3 other
projects
* Flawed marketing
T Cash -
Indonesia
,
Project Adoption Project Name - Socio Economic Context Technological Context Demand for Financial Project Features Project Outcome
Level Country Services
" Rapidly growing
developing country with
a high degree of
inequality
e Large diaspora whose
income contributes to a
sizable part of the
economy by a way of
incoming international
remittances
" Poorest country South
America, largely
dependent on informal
economy
* Enjoyed recent stability
and benefitted from
trade terms with
Mercosur partners
" Depends on agriculture
and has a relatively high
level of rural population
" World Bank and IMF-
led reforms early in the
90's sent the country
into the path of
prosperity. Now it leads
Africa in growth
" Services are already
two-thirds of the
economy but most
people still live in rural
areas
" Fast growing MNO's
have continually looked
to invest in other
opportunities and acted
early to tap the demand
of financial services
" MNO's are also famous
for inducing the uptake
of other mobile
technology such as text
messages
" Highly growing mobile
sector which has made
up for a sluggish
increase of fixed
services and the internet.
" Competitive and
privately owned mobile
industry
" Regulators welcoming of
innovation
" Telecom hast been a
major driver for growth
in the economy
" Near-monopoly by.
Safaricom on highly
penetrated mobile
market
* Government has been
welcoming and
permissive with
Safaricom's efforts and
innovative initiatives
" Banking industry growth
has encouraged
competition from large
players
* Growth has not
translated into access to
the poor
* Large informal banking
sector suggests high
demand for many
services
* Opening to foreign
capital has not brought
in the desired growth
and access to financial
services
* Demand is latent and a
large informal sector has
developed around it
* Financial access is a
priority for the
government
" Competitive and
growing financial
services industry
" High costs continue to
prevent bank's
expansion to target the
poor
" Highly unproductive and
risky ways to send
money throughout the
country
* Launched by market-
leader, innovating in a
services that was not
seen anywhere in the
world
" Motivated by the large
in-flow of international
remittances
* Partnered with Banco de
Oro and MasterCard
" Launched by market
leader as a retail
payments service
" Due to lack of adoption
the company turned to
focus on remittances
" Leveraged existing
distribution network to
add more agents
" Simple Value
proposition focusing on
remittances
" Safaricom sought to
leverage its airtime
distribution network to
use as agents
* Strategic plan would
seek more financial
services in the future
" Grew gradually but
steadily to become a
benchmark in the world
" Leveraged remittances
effectively as the main
value proposition
* Penetrated its massive
airtime distribution
network to enlist Mobile
Money agents
" Rivalry has encouraged
innovation
Example of success in
Latin America and
benchmark for the
region
Large and well-managed
agent network based on
pre-existing capabilities
Invested heavily on
marketing support to
increase awareness
" Most successful product
in the world and
benchmark for future
projects
" Developed a massive
agent network beyond
any expectation
" Pulled from Safaricom's
strong brand and
invested heavily on
marketing
High Adoption SmartMoney -
Philippines
Giros Tigo -
Paraguay
